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We study the consistency of a number of probability distributions, which are allowed to be
imprecise. To make the treatment as general as possible, we represent those probabilistic
assessments as a collection of conditional lower previsions. The problem then becomes
proving Walley’s (strong) coherence of the assessments. In order to maintain generality
in the analysis, we assume to be given nearly no information about the numbers that
make up the lower previsions in the collection. Under this condition, we investigate
the extent to which the above global task can be decomposed into simpler and more
local ones. This is done by introducing a graphical representation of the conditional
lower previsions that we call the coherence graph: we show that the coherence graph
allows one to isolate some subsets of the collection whose coherence is suﬃcient for the
coherence of all the assessments; and we provide a polynomial-time algorithm that ﬁnds
the subsets eﬃciently. We show some of the implications of our results by focusing on
three models and problems: Bayesian and credal networks, of which we prove coherence;
the compatibility problem, for which we provide an optimal graphical decomposition;
probabilistic satisﬁability, of which we show that some intractable instances can instead
be solved eﬃciently by exploiting coherence graphs.
© 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
We focus on studying the consistency of a number of conditional and unconditional distributions of some variables.
In order to make our treatment as general as possible, we are going to represent these probabilistic assessments using
the theory of coherent lower previsions developed by Walley in [33], which is based on de Finetti’s work about subjective
probability [10,11]. This allows us to study the case where the above distributions are imprecise, i.e., where each of them
is actually a closed convex set of precise distributions, which includes as a particular case that where our assessments are
precise probabilities. It also allows us to work with any type of variable, without placing restrictions on the admissible
possibility spaces (ﬁnite, countable, continuous). The approach by Walley includes also as particular cases most of the other
imprecise probability models appearing in the literature.
Studying the consistency problem is important both for theoretical and applied reasons. On the theoretical side, it has
been shown by de Finetti that a subjective theory of precise probability (such as the Bayesian theory) can be founded on
a single axiom of consistency. Williams [35] and later Walley have shown that this continues to hold when such a theory
is generalised to handle imprecision in probability. In these theories proving consistency is therefore a necessary step to
exploit all the tools they provide us with, such as Bayes’ rule and its generalisations. The application of these tools alone,
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by Walley.
On the applied side, it is a very common requirement that an inference method should not give rise to inconsistencies.
This requirement is present, for example, in probabilistic logic [26], where one has to check ﬁrst of all that the available
assessments are self-consistent. It is also present in the many other models and methods designed so as to give rise to
a joint distribution, which is often regarded as a feature that ensures global consistency. Exactly this argument was used,
for example, to support Bayesian networks versus rule-based systems already at the time of Pearl’s seminal work [27]. But
consistency is quite a subtle concept to deal with. The following striking example adapted from [33, Section 7.3.5] shows
that the existence of a compatible joint is not always a good way to get rid of inconsistencies.
Example 1. Let X1, X2 be two variables taking values in {1,2,3}, and assume that X1 = 3 if and only if X2 = 3, and for the
other cases we have the contradictory information X1 = X2 and X1 = X2. We can model this by the conditional probabilities
P (X1 = 3|X2 = 3) = 1 = P (X2 = 3|X1 = 3), P (X1 = 1|X2 = 1) = 1 = P (X1 = 2|X2 = 2) and P (X2 = 1|X1 = 2) = 1 = P (X2 =
2|X1 = 1). Despite the contradiction, it can be checked that the assessments are compatible with the joint mass function
determined by P (X1 = 3, X2 = 3) = 1, in the sense that this joint induces the above conditionals by Bayes’ rule when the
conditioning events have positive probability.1
The key here is that Bayes’ rule cannot be always applied because of the presence of events with zero probability; this
technical issue prevents the contradiction from being identiﬁed. It follows that in order to check consistency we generally
need stronger tools than those based on the existence of a compatible joint distribution. Walley’s notion of coherence
appears to be one such tool.
In fact, Walley considers two different consistency concepts for conditional lower previsions, called weak coherence and
(strong) coherence (these will be introduced in Section 2, along with other material about Walley’s theory). What we show
in Section 3 is that a number of conditional lower previsions are weakly coherent when they can all be induced by the same
joint via Bayes’ rule (or its generalisation for the imprecise case) and marginalisations. In other words, we show that weak
coherence is the generalisation to imprecise probability of the consistency criterion based on the existence of a compatible
joint. Coherence, on the other hand, strengthens weak coherence and it can be shown that the difference between weak
and strong coherence is indeed related to conditioning on sets of probability zero (see [21]).
Our goal in this paper is to simplify the veriﬁcation of the weak or the strong coherence of a number of assessments. To
achieve this, we introduce in Section 5 a new graphical representation called coherence graphs. We prove in Section 6 that
coherence graphs allow us to decompose the task of verifying weak and strong coherence in a number of simpler tasks.
Speciﬁcally, they help us determine a partition of the set of assessments with the property that coherence (resp., weak
coherence) within each of the elements of the partition implies coherence (resp., weak coherence) of all the assessments.
We prove moreover that this is the ﬁnest partition with this property in the case of weak coherence. Besides, this partition
of our set of assessments can be determined with a polynomial-time algorithm, which we present in Section 7.
Then we move to show some of the implications of our results for artiﬁcial intelligence by considering three well-known
related research ﬁelds. In Section 8.1, we consider Bayesian networks [27] and their extension to imprecise probability called
credal networks [8]. By joining coherence graphs with a notion of probabilistic independence, we show for the ﬁrst time
and to a very large extent that Bayesian and credal networks are coherent models. In Section 8.2 we focus on the so-
called compatibility problem (see [9] and the references therein for a recent overview), i.e., the problem of deciding whether
a number of distributions has a compatible joint. In this case we exploit our results about weak coherence to deliver
new graphical criteria that enable one to optimally decompose such a problem, under a very general formulation. Finally,
in Section 8.3 we relate our results to a powerful form of probabilistic satisﬁability based on consistency that has been
recently proposed in [34]. In particular, we discuss how probabilistic satisﬁability can be used to check the consistency of
a number of (possibly imprecise) conditional and unconditional mass functions, and we outline that this task can easily
become intractable as a consequence of the NP-hardness of the problem [5]. Moreover, we show that coherence graphs can
decompose such a task in a way that makes it possible to solve some instances of the problem that would otherwise be
intractable.
As we said, our results are very general, in the sense that they are applicable for variables taking values on ﬁnite or
inﬁnite spaces, and that we can also consider precise or imprecise representations. We make nevertheless some assumptions,
like the logical independence of the variables studied or the representation of our assessments through a functional deﬁned
on a suﬃciently large domain. In Section 9, we comment on the extent to which these assumptions can be relaxed. This
is an important problem in order to relate our work more tightly with other areas of research. Finally, we conclude the
paper in Section 10 with some additional discussion. To make the paper easier to read, we have relegated all the proofs to
Appendix A.
1 This consistency notion is what we shall call later in this paper weak coherence. Note that the contradictory assessments X1 = X2 and X1 = X2 can also
be modelled by other conditional probabilities that do not even satisfy this consistency notion, for instance P (X1 = 1|X2 = 1) = 1 = P (X1 = 2|X2 = 1).
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Let us give a short introduction to the concepts and results from the behavioural theory of imprecise probabilities that
we shall use in the rest of the paper. We refer to [33] for an in-depth study of these and other properties, and for an
interpretation of the notions we shall introduce below.
Given a possibility space Ω , a gamble is a bounded real-valued function on Ω .2 This function represents a random reward
f (ω), which depends on the a priori unknown value ω of Ω . We shall denote by L(Ω) the set of all gambles on Ω . A lower
prevision P is a real functional deﬁned on some set of gambles K ⊆ L(Ω). It is used to represent a subject’s supremum
acceptable buying prices for these gambles.
We can also consider the supremum acceptable buying price for a gamble conditional on a subset of Ω . Given such a
set B and a gamble f on Ω , the lower prevision P ( f |B) represents the subject’s supremum acceptable buying price for
the gamble f , updated after coming to know that the unknown value ω belongs to B , and nothing else. If we consider a
partition B of Ω (for instance a set of categories), then we shall represent by P ( f |B) the gamble on Ω that takes the value
P ( f |B) if and only if ω ∈ B . The functional P (·|B) that maps any gamble f on its domain into the gamble P ( f |B) is called
a conditional lower prevision.
Let us now re-formulate the above concepts in terms of variables, which are the focus of our attention in this paper.
Consider variables X1, . . . , Xn , taking values in respective sets X1, . . . ,Xn . For any subset J ⊆ {1, . . . ,n} we shall denote by
X J the (new) variable
X J := (X j) j∈ J ,
which takes values in the product space
X J := × j∈ JX j .
We shall also use the notation X n for X{1,...,n} . This will be our possibility space in the rest of the paper.
Deﬁnition 1. Let J be a subset of {1, . . . ,n}, and let π J : X n → X J be the so-called projection operator, i.e., the operator that
drops the elements of a vector in X n that do not correspond to indexes in J . A gamble f on X n is called X J -measurable
when for any x, y ∈ X n , π J (x) = π J (y) implies that f (x) = f (y).
There exists a one-to-one correspondence between the gambles on X n that are X J -measurable and the gambles on X J .
We shall denote by K J the set of X J -measurable gambles.
Consider two disjoint subsets O , I of {1, . . . ,n}. Then P (XO |XI ) represents a subject’s behavioural dispositions about
the gambles that depend on the outcome of the variables {Xk,k ∈ O }, after coming to know the outcome of the variables
{Xk,k ∈ I}. As such, it is deﬁned on the set of gambles that depend on the values of the variables in O ∪ I only, i.e., on the
set KO∪I of the XO∪I -measurable gambles on X n . When there is no possible confusion about the variables involved in the
lower prevision, we shall use the notation P ( f |x) for P ( f |XI = x). The sets {π−1I (x) : x ∈ XI } form a partition of X n . Hence,
we can deﬁne the gamble P ( f |XI ), which takes the value P ( f |x) on x ∈ XI . This is a conditional lower prevision.
This type of conditional previsions is what we are going to consider throughout the paper. We refer to [22,33] for more
general deﬁnitions of the following notions in this section in terms of partitions, and for domains that are not necessarily
(these) linear sets of gambles. A deﬁnition of conditional previsions where we do not necessarily condition on a partition
can be found in [35].
The XI -support S( f ) of a gamble f in KO∪I is given by
S( f ) := {π−1I (x): x ∈ XI , f Iπ−1I (x) = 0}, (1)
i.e., it is the set of conditioning events for which the restriction of f is not identically zero. Here, and in the rest of the
paper, IA will be used to denote the indicator function of the set A, i.e., the function whose value is 1 in the elements of A
and 0 elsewhere. Also, for any gamble f in the domain KO∪I of the conditional lower prevision P (XO |XI ), and any x ∈ XI ,
we shall denote by G( f |x) the gamble Iπ−1I (x)( f − P ( f |x)), and by G( f |XI ) the gamble that takes the value G( f |πI (y)) for
any y ∈ X n .
These assessments can be made for any disjoint subsets O , I of {1, . . . ,n}, and therefore it is not uncommon to model
a subject’s beliefs using a ﬁnite number of different conditional lower previsions. Then we should verify that all the as-
sessments modelled by these conditional lower previsions are consistent with one another. The ﬁrst requirement we make
is that for any disjoint O , I ⊆ {1, . . . ,n}, the conditional lower prevision P (XO |XI ) deﬁned on KO∪I should be separately
coherent. In this case, where the domain is a linear set of gambles, separate coherence holds if and only if the following
conditions are satisﬁed for any x ∈ XI , f , g ∈ KO∪I , and λ > 0:
(SC1) P ( f |x) infy∈π−1I (x) f (y).
2 Although we only deal in this paper with bounded gambles, an extension of the theory to unbounded gambles can be found in [30].
E. Miranda, M. Zaffalon / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 173 (2009) 104–144 107(SC2) P (λ f |x) = λP ( f |x).
(SC3) P ( f + g|x) P ( f |x) + P (g|x).
It shall also be interesting for this paper to consider the particular case where I = ∅, that is, when we have (uncon-
ditional) information about the variables XO . We have then an (unconditional) lower prevision P (XO ) on the set KO of
XO -measurable gambles. Then separate coherence is simply called coherence, and it holds if and only if the following three
conditions hold for any f , g ∈ KO , and λ > 0:
(C1) P ( f ) inf f .
(C2) P (λ f ) = λP ( f ).
(C3) P ( f + g) P ( f ) + P (g).
In general, separate coherence is not enough to guarantee the consistency of the lower previsions: conditional lower
previsions can be conditional on the values of many different variables, and still we should verify that the assessments they
provide are consistent not only separately, but also with one another. Formally, we are going to consider what we shall call
collections of conditional lower previsions.
Deﬁnition 2. Let {P1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , P m(XOm |XIm )} be conditional lower previsions with respective domains K1, . . . ,Km ⊆
L(X n), where K j is the set of XO j∪I j -measurable gambles,3 for j = 1, . . . ,m. Then this is called a collection on X n when
for each j1 = j2 in {1, . . . ,m}, either O j1 = O j2 or I j1 = I j2 .
This means that we do not have two different conditional lower previsions giving information about the same set of
variables XO , conditional on the same set of variables XI . Given a collection {P1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , P m(XOm |XIm )} of conditional
lower previsions, there are different ways in which we can guarantee their consistency.
Deﬁnition 3. Let P1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , P m(XOm |XIm ) be separately coherent conditional lower previsions. We say that they avoid






G j( f j |XI j )
]
(x) 0,
for every f j ∈ K j , j = 1, . . . ,m.
Deﬁnition 4. Let P1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , P m(XOm |XIm ) be separately coherent conditional lower previsions. We say that they avoid






G j( f j |XI j )
]
(x) 0, (2)
where S j( f j) is the XI j -support of f j given by Eq. (1).
The notions of avoiding partial or uniform sure loss are minimal consistency requirements that we shall use in Section 8
to connect our work with probabilistic logic; nevertheless, the main focus in this paper will be made on some stronger
notions, that we shall call weak and strong coherence:
Deﬁnition 5. Let P1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , P m(XOm |XIm ) be separately coherent conditional lower previsions. We say that they are






G j( f j |XI j ) − G j0 ( f0|z0)
]
(x) 0. (3)
Under the behavioural interpretation, a number of weakly coherent conditional lower previsions can still present some
forms of inconsistency with one another; see [33, Example 7.3.5] for an example and [33, Chapter 7] and [34] for some
discussion. Because of this, we consider yet a stronger notion, called (joint or strong) coherence:4
3 We use K j instead of KO j∪I j in order to alleviate the notation when no confusion is possible about the variables involved.
4 The distinction between this and the unconditional notion of coherence mentioned above will always be clear from the context.
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G j( f j |XI j ) − G j0 ( f0|z0)
]
(x) 0, (4)
where, again, S j( f j) is the XI j -support of f j given by Eq. (1).
The coherence of a collection of conditional lower previsions implies their weak coherence; although the converse
does not hold in general, it does in the particular case when we only have a conditional and an unconditional lower
prevision. Note for instance that the conditional previsions in Example 1 in the Introduction are not coherent: if we con-
sider f1 := I{(1,1),(2,2)} and f2 := I{(2,1),(1,2)} , then G( f1|X2) + G( f2|X1) < 0 in the union of the supports, which is the set
{(1,1), (1,2), (1,3), (2,1), (2,2), (2,3), (3,1), (3,2)}.
In the next section, we prove a number of results that will help to better understand the differences between weak
and strong coherence. But before we do that, we introduce a special case that will be of interest for us: that of conditional
linear previsions. We say that a conditional lower prevision P (XO |XI ) on the set KO∪I is linear if and only if it is sepa-
rately coherent and moreover P ( f + g|x) = P ( f |x) + P (g|x) for any x ∈ XI and f , g ∈ KO∪I . When a separately coherent
conditional lower prevision P (XO |XI ) is linear we shall denote it by P (XO |XI ); in the unconditional case, we shall use the
notation P (XO ). A separately coherent unconditional linear prevision corresponds to the expectation operator (the Dunford
integral [4]) with respect to a ﬁnitely additive probability.
If we consider conditional linear previsions P1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , Pm(XOm |XIm ) with domains K1, . . . ,Km , then they are
coherent if and only if they avoid partial loss, and they are weakly coherent if and only if they avoid uniform sure loss [33,
Section 7.1, page 347].
A conditional lower prevision P (XO |XI ) is separately coherent if and only if it is the lower envelope of a closed (in
the weak* topology) convex set of dominating conditional linear previsions, where P (XO |XI ) is said to dominate P (XO |XI )
when for every XO∪I -measurable gamble f , P ( f |x) P ( f |x) for every x ∈ XI (this is a consequence of [33, Sections 6.7.2
and 6.7.4]). We shall denote this set of dominating conditional linear previsions by M(P (XO |XI )).
Finally, one interesting particular case is that where we are given only an unconditional lower prevision P on L(X n)
and a conditional lower prevision P (XO |XI ) on KO∪I . Then weak and strong coherence are equivalent, and they both hold
if and only if, for any XO∪I -measurable f and any x ∈ XI ,
(JC1) P (G( f |XI )) 0
(JC2) P (G( f |x)) = 0.
If both P and P (XO |XI ) are linear previsions, they are coherent if and only if for any XO∪I -measurable f it holds that
P ( f ) = P (P ( f |XI )).
Before concluding this section, it is important to remark that if a lower prevision P is coherent with a conditional lower
prevision P (·|B), then P must satisfy the property of conglomerability, which is discussed in some detail in [33, Section 6.8].
This property is one of the points of disagreement between Walley’s and de Finetti’s [13] approach to conditional previsions.
3. Weak and strong coherence
The following theorem gives a new characterisation of the weak coherence of the conditional lower previsions
P1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , P m(XOm |XIm ).
Theorem 1. P1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , P m(XOm |XIm ) are weakly coherent if and only if there is some coherent lower prevision P on L(X n)
such that, for any j = 1, . . . ,m,{
P (G j( f |XI j )) 0 for any f in K j
P (G j( f |x)) = 0 for any f in K j, x in XI j .
In particular, conditional linear previsions P1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , Pm(XOm |XIm ) are weakly coherent if and only if there exists a coherent
prevision P on X n such that P ( f ) = P (P j( f |XI j )) for any f in K j , j = 1, . . . ,m.
Remark 1. When all the conditional previsions are linear and moreover all the spaces X1, . . . ,Xn are ﬁnite, we deduce from
Theorem 1 that the weak coherence of the conditional previsions P j(XO j |XI j ), j = 1, . . . ,m, is equivalent to the existence
of a linear prevision (a ﬁnitely additive probability) on X n inducing the conditional previsions by means of Bayes’ rule.
This is not enough, however, for the conditional previsions to be coherent, because of how these conditions deal with
the problem of conditioning on sets of probability zero. For instance, the conditional previsions in Example 1 are weakly
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shall come back to this in Section 8.2.
From this theorem, we can easily deduce the following two results that relate (weak or strong) coherence to the existence
of an unconditional lower prevision that is (weakly or strongly) coherent with the collection.
Proposition 1. Let P1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , P m(XOm |XIm ) be conditional lower previsions. They are coherent if and only if there is some
coherent unconditional lower prevision P on L(X n) such that P , P1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , P m(XOm |XIm ) are coherent.
Corollary 1. The conditional lower previsions P1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , P m(XOm |XIm ) are weakly coherent if and only if there is some coher-
ent lower prevision P on L(X n) such that P , P1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , P m(XOm |XIm ) are weakly coherent.
These two results allow us to understand a bit better the conceptual difference between weak coherence and (strong)
coherence: from Corollary 1 and Theorem 1, weak coherence amounts to the existence of a joint that is pairwise coherent
with each of the conditional lower previsions; from Proposition 1, coherence means that there is a joint that is coherent
with all the conditional lower previsions, taken together.
This difference is perhaps easier to grasp in the particular case where we deal with ﬁnite spaces and with linear con-
ditional previsions. In that case, weak coherence is equivalent to the existence of a linear prevision (the expectation with
respect to a ﬁnitely additive probability) that induces each of the conditional previsions by means of Bayes’ rule. But this
does not guarantee that the conditional previsions are coherent, because the joint mentioned above might not be coherent
with all of them considered as a whole. That is, the conditional previsions may provoke some behavioural inconsistencies
when taken together even if they can all be induced from the same joint. This is due to the fact that when this joint gives
zero probability to a set B , then any conditional prevision P (·|B) is coherent with the joint.
4. Collection templates
With this paper we should like to deliver tools to prove coherence that are suﬃciently general to be applied in most
situations. To do this, we have to assume very little about the conditional lower previsions that are the subject of our study.
In particular, we are not going to assume anything about the numbers that make up the lower previsions themselves, other
than they produce separately coherent assessments. We do require separate coherence as it is really a minimal requirement
of self-consistency for a conditional lower prevision.
Abstracting away from the numbers implies that for each lower prevision we only know, apart from its being separately
coherent, what are the variables on both sides of the conditioning bar. This can be regarded as the ‘form’ of a conditional
lower prevision, or its template, as we call it in the following.
Deﬁnition 7. Let P j1 (XO j1 |XI j1 ) and P j2 (XO j2 |XI j2 ) be two lower previsions on X n . We say that they have the same template
if O j1 = O j2 and I j1 = I j2 . The class of all the lower previsions on X n with the same template is just called a lower prevision
template on X n (of the generic lower previsions in the class). We denote a lower prevision template in the same way as we
denote a lower prevision (the distinction should be clear from the context): i.e., by P j(XO j |XI j ).
We can identify a template with a disjoint pair of indices. A collection template is then determined by a ﬁnite number
of such pairs. This is formalised in the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 8. Two collections of lower previsions on X n have the same template if they contain the same number m of lower
previsions, and if it is possible to order the elements in each collection in such a way that for all j in {1, . . . ,m} the two
respective jth lower previsions have the same template. The class of all the collections on X n with the same template
is just called a collection template on X n (of the generic collection in the class). We denote a collection template in the
same way as we denote a collection of lower previsions (again, the distinction should be clear from the context): i.e., by
{P1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , P m(XOm |XIm )}.
An equivalent way to look at a collection template is as a collection of lower prevision templates. For this reason, we
shall sometimes refer to the lower prevision templates in a collection template.
The deﬁnitions just introduced allow us to state the task of this paper more precisely: i.e., to characterise what we know
about the coherence of a collection of (separately coherent) lower previsions once we know its template alone. To this
extent, it is useful to introduce a graphical characterisation of a collection template. This is done in the next section.
5. Coherence graphs
In this section, we introduce a graphical representation of collection templates based on directed graphs. We start by
recalling some terminology from graph theory.
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by an arc are also called its endpoints. A sequence of at least two nodes for which each pair of adjacent nodes is an arc
in the graph, is called directed path between the ﬁrst and the last node in the sequence (also called origin and destination,
respectively). When the origin and destination coincide, we say that the path is a directed cycle, or just a cycle, for short. If
a cycle does not contain any proper cycle, then it is said to be elementary. Note that a path uniquely identiﬁes a sequence
of arcs; for this reason, by an abuse of terminology, we shall sometimes refer to the arcs of a path.
It is useful to introduce also the notion of strong component of a directed graph. This is a maximal strongly connected
subgraph, where a strongly connected graph is one for which there is a path for each ordered pair of nodes. A strong
component is said to be trivial if it is made by a single node.
The predecessors of a node are all the nodes that have a directed path towards the given node. The predecessors for
which there is a directed path made up of a single arc, are called parents. The indegree of a node is the number of its
parents. A node with indegree equal to zero is called a root. Similarly, the successors of a node are all the nodes that can
be reached from the given node following directed paths. The successors for which there is a directed path made up of a
single arc, are called children. The outdegree of a node is the number of its children. A node with outdegree equal to zero is
called a leaf.
The union of the set of parents and children of a node is called the set of its neighbours. The union of two graphs is a
graph created by taking the union of their nodes and their arcs, respectively.
Now we are ready to deﬁne the most important graphical notion used in this paper.
Deﬁnition 9. Consider two ﬁnite sets Z = {X1, . . . , Xn} and D = {D1, . . . , Dm} of so-called actual and dummy nodes, respec-
tively. Call N := Z ∪ D the set of nodes, and a given A ⊆ N × N the set of arcs. The triple 〈Z,D,A〉 is called a coherence
graph on Z if the following properties hold:
(CG1) Z is non-empty.
(CG2) All neighbours of dummy nodes are actual nodes, and vice versa.
(CG3) The set of the parents and that of the children of any dummy node have an empty intersection.
(CG4) Dummy nodes are not leaves.
(CG5) Different dummy nodes do not have both the same parents and the same children.
Fig. 1 displays the coherence graph of the assessments
P1(X1), P2(X4|X1), P3(X6|X5), P4(X7|X2), P5(X7|X3), P6(X8|X3), P7(X8|X4), P8(X9|X1, X5),
P9(X10|X13), P10(X11|X7), P11(X12|X8), P12(X13|X14), P13(X14|X6, X10), P14(X15, X16|X9, X12, X13).
Here the actual nodes are X1, . . . , X16. Note that to make graphs easier to see, we represent dummy nodes in a simpliﬁed
way: we do not show their labels and rather represent each of them simply as a black solid circle (this does not create a
problem since by CG5 each dummy node is univocally identiﬁed by its neighbours); moreover, when a dummy node has
exactly one parent and one child, we do not represent the arrow entering the dummy node (this is not going to cause
ambiguity either).
Next, we show that there is a one-to-one relationship between coherence graphs on Z = {X1, . . . , Xn} and collection
templates on X n . To this extent, it is useful to isolate the notion of a D-structure in a coherence graph.
Deﬁnition 10. Given a dummy node D of a coherence graph, we call D-structure the subgraph whose nodes are D and its
neighbours, and whose arcs are those connecting D to its neighbours.
At this point we consider two functions: the ﬁrst one, which we shall denote by Γ , maps a collection template
{P1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , P m(XOm |XIm )}, related to the variables {X1, . . . , Xn} =: Z , into a coherence graph on Z , with dummy
nodes {D1, . . . , Dm}. This mapping is determined by the following procedure:
Fig. 1. The coherence graph for P1, . . . , P14.
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(Γ 2) Let D := {D1, . . . , Dm} be the set of dummy nodes.
(Γ 3) Let A := ∅.
(Γ 4) For all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, all i1 ∈ I j , all i2 ∈ O j , add the arcs (Xi1 , D j) and (D j, Xi2) to A.
The second function, which we denote by Γ −1, maps a coherence graph on Z = {X1, . . . , Xn}, with dummy nodes
{D1, . . . , Dm}, into the collection template{
P1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , P m(XOm |XIm )
}
related to the variables {X1, . . . , Xn}. This mapping is determined by the following procedure:
(Γ −11) Set the collection of lower prevision templates equal to the empty set.
(Γ −12) For all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, add P j(XO j |XI j ) to the collection template, where O j and I j are the set of indexes of the
children and the parents of D j , respectively.
The idea behind the two functions is very simple: identifying lower prevision templates in a collection with D-structures
in the related coherence graph, and vice versa. This makes the two functions to be each other’s inverses as it is established
in the following proposition, whose elementary proof is omitted:
Proposition 2. There is a one-to-one relationship between coherence graphs and collection templates.
This proposition enables us to graphically display some basic conﬁgurations of collection templates that are problematic
with respect to the coherence of the collection. One such conﬁguration is created by collection templates whose coherence
graph contains an actual node with more than one parent, such as X8 in Fig. 1. In this case there are two different condi-
tional lower previsions, P6(X8|X3) and P7(X8|X4), that express knowledge about X8. In this situation it is not possible to
deduce the coherence of the collection only taking its template into account. The reason is that it is always possible to ﬁnd
a speciﬁc instance of lower previsions with the given template that is incoherent. This is enough because any claim that we
make based only on the template must be valid, by deﬁnition, for all the collections of lower previsions with the considered
template. For instance, consider x81 = x82 in X8, and deﬁne, for any gamble f on X8, P6( f |x3) := f (x81) for all x3 ∈ X3, and
P7( f |x4) := f (x82) for all x4 ∈ X4. This speciﬁc choice corresponds to use (precise) degenerate distributions that put all the
probability mass on x81 and x
8
2, respectively, and this irrespective of their conditioning events. It follows that P6(X8|X3)
implies that X8 = x81 and P7(X8|X4) that X8 = x82, a contradiction.5
Another problematic conﬁguration arises out of collection templates whose coherence graph contains a cycle; this is the
case of the actual nodes X10, X13, X14, in Fig. 1. In this case we can create a contradiction by deﬁning the lower previsions
involved in the cycle as follows. Consider x101 = x102 in X10, x141 = x142 in X14, x131 = x132 in X13. Let
P9( f |x13) :=
{
f (x101 ) if x
13 = x131
f (x102 ) otherwise,
P13(g|x6, x10) :=
{





h(x131 ) if x
14 = x142
h(x132 ) otherwise,
for arbitrary gambles f on X10, g on X14, h on X13. These deﬁnitions again correspond to use degenerate (and precise)
distributions: for example, P9(X10|X13) corresponds to a distribution that puts all the probability mass on x101 if X13 = x131 ,
and on x102 otherwise; in other words, P9(X10|X13) models the fact that X10 = x101 holds with probability one assuming it is
known that X13 = x131 , and otherwise, if X13 = x131 , that X10 = x102 , also with probability one. Analogously, P13(X14|X6, X10)
states that X14 = x141 resp. X14 = x142 hold with probability one provided that X10 = x101 resp. X10 = x101 ; ﬁnally, P12(X13|X14)
that X13 = x131 resp. X13 = x132 hold with probability one provided that X14 = x142 resp. X14 = x142 .
At this point it is easy to see that the cycle gives rise to a contradiction. Assume that X13 = x131 . Using the above con-
siderations, this implies with probability one that X10 = x101 , then that X14 = x141 , and ﬁnally that X13 = x132 , a contradiction.
5 In this example, as well as in some of the proofs in Appendix A, we use 0–1 valued probabilities to make things simpler, but we can equivalently
use probabilities that are never degenerate as above. In this example, for instance, deﬁne P6( f |x3) := 0.1 f (x81) + 0.9 f (x82) for all x3 ∈ X3, and P7( f |x4) :=
0.1 f (x82) + 0.9 f (x81) for all x4 ∈ X4. This corresponds to using probability masses on (x81, x82) equal to (0.1,0.9) and (0.9,0.1), respectively, irrespective of
their conditioning events. To see that these two conditional previsions are not compatible with any joint mass function P on X{3,4} , note that given any
such P we should deduce on the one hand that P ({x81}) = 0.1 and on the other that P ({x81}) = 0.9, a contradiction. Also the following example based on
cycles can be re-worked, with some additional complications, using only non-degenerate probabilities.
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together with the speciﬁc choice of lower previsions, codes the contradictory statement that X13 should be equal to two
different values. And since we have been able to ﬁnd some speciﬁc lower previsions with the given template that are inco-
herent, then we cannot deduce coherence only considering the related coherence graph—just because it contains a cycle.
These considerations motivate the following two deﬁnitions, which introduce some graph-based terminology that is more
directly relevant to our subsequent results.
Deﬁnition 11. We say that an actual node of a coherence graph is a (potential) source of contradiction if it has more than one
parent or if it belongs to a cycle.
More formally, if an actual node X has more than one parent, this means that there are 1  i1 = i2  m such that
 ∈ O i1 ∩ O i2 . On the other hand, the fact that X belongs to a cycle implies that it is involved in (at least) an elementary
cycle, and so that there are different j1, . . . , jp in {1, . . . ,m} such that
O j1 ∩ I j2 = ∅, O j2 ∩ I j3 = ∅, . . . , O jp ∩ I j1 = ∅, (5)
and with  belonging to one of these non-empty intersections.
Deﬁnition 12. A coherence graph without sources of contradiction is said to be of type A1: i.e., acyclic and with maximum
indegree for actual nodes equal to one. The corresponding collection template is said to be representable as a graph of type A1,
or simply A1-representable.
The graph in Fig. 1 is obviously not of type A1, as there are ﬁve sources of contradiction: X7 and X8, because each of
them has two parents; and X10, X13 and X14, because they are part of a cycle. An example of an A1 graph is given in Fig. 2.
This is a subgraph of that in Fig. 1 where we have eliminated a number of elements creating sources of contradiction. This
also shows that A1 graphs can take complicated forms.
When there are sources of contradiction in a coherence graph, it is useful to isolate some special subgraphs that are
related to them, and which we call blocks.
Deﬁnition 13. Given a source of contradiction Z , call block for Z , or B Z , the subgraph obtained by taking the union of the
D-structures of the dummy nodes that are predecessors of Z .
The reason why we introduce blocks is to capture the idea of the ‘area of inﬂuence’ of a certain source of contradiction.
This is easy to see in the case of an actual node with more than one parent, such as X8 in Fig. 1. In this case we can again
use degenerate distributions in such a way that P6(X8|X3) forces X8 to take a certain value x81; that P7(X8|X4) forces X4 to
take a certain value x41 when X8 = x81, and in turn, that P2(X4|X1) forces X1 to take a certain value x11 when X4 = x41. In this
case, exploiting the source of contradiction, we can force a speciﬁc value on a node such as X1 that can be far away from
the source itself. This is useful in the proofs to show how to use a source of contradiction to actually create a contradiction
somewhere: in the example above, for instance, we can deﬁne P1(X1) so as to force X1 to take a value different from x
1
1,
thus originating a contradiction at X1. The situation is a bit more complicated with cycles, but the effect is eventually the
same.
It is useful to study a bit more in detail the situations just sketched. For this, we are going to introduce the notion of
constraining sub-block for an actual node in a block. This will be a subset of the previsions of the block with the property
that we can assign them certain values for which there is a unique value in the actual node compatible with them. In
the previous example the constraining sub-block for X1 would be determined by the previsions P6(X8|X3), P7(X8|X4) and
P2(X4|X1).
Fig. 2. An example of an A1 coherence graph.
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of the arcs) so as to eventually force an actual node to take on a chosen value. This property will be used in Theorem 4 to
decompose the task of verifying weak coherence in an optimal way.
Consider ﬁrst of all a block B Z originated by an actual node Xs with more than one parent. Then there exist 1 
i1 = i2  m such that s ∈ O i1 ∩ O i2 . For any actual node X in B Z , there exists a path leading from X to the node Xs
originating the block. Hence, there are i1, . . . , ip in {1, . . . ,m} such that s ∈ O i1 ∩ O i2 , Ii2 ∩ O i3 = ∅, . . . , Iip−1 ∩ O ip = ∅,
and  ∈ Iip . Note that we can assume without loss of generality that the nodes {i1, . . . , ip} are all different: otherwise,
we could establish a cycle in the path from X to Xs , and by eliminating these cycles we should obtain another (shorter)
path going from X to Xs where all the indices are different. We shall refer to a set of indices {i1, . . . , ip} such that
s ∈ O i1 ∩ O i2 , Ii2 ∩ O i3 = ∅, . . . , Iip−1 ∩ O ip = ∅,  ∈ Iip as a the constraining sub-block for X in the block generated by Xs .
Note that such a sub-block is not necessarily unique.
Consider now a block B Z which is generated by a cycle. Then this cycle corresponds to a strong component in the
coherence graph, in the sense that for any two nodes Xs1 and Xs2 in the component there is a path going from Xs1 to Xs2
and another one going from Xs2 to Xs1 ; hence, Xs1 and Xs2 belong to a cycle.
Again, we have two possibilities: that a node Xs in the block B Z belongs to the strong component of the block, or that
it is a predecessor of this strong component. In the ﬁrst case, Xs belongs to an elementary cycle, meaning that there exist
j1, . . . , jp ∈ {1, . . . ,m} satisfying Eq. (5) and s ∈ O j1 ∩ I j2 . Consider on the other hand a predecessor X of this source of
contradiction. Then X is a predecessor of the nodes in an elementary cycle, which we denote by Xs , and it is not itself in
the cycle. Let j1, . . . , jp be the indices of the previsions in the cycle, meaning that they satisfy Eq. (5), with s ∈ O j1 ∩ I j2 .
Then there exist k1, . . . ,kr such that  ∈ Ok1 ∩ Ik2 , Ok2 ∩ Ik3 = ∅, . . . , Okr−1 ∩ Ikr = ∅, and where kr is one of the indices in
the cycle, for instance kr = j1.
The indices j1, . . . , jp are all different, because the cycle is elementary. Moreover, we can also assume that the indices
{k1, . . . ,kr−1} are different from { j1, . . . , jp}: otherwise, we can eliminate the indices they have in common and we should
still have a path from X to the cycle. Finally, we can assume without loss of generality that the indices {k1, . . . ,kr−1} are
all different, because otherwise we should be able to establish a cycle in them, and by eliminating these cycles we should
obtain another (shorter) path from X to the cycle. We shall refer to the indices {k2, . . . ,kr−1, j1, . . . , jp} as a constraining
sub-block for X in the block associated to the source of contradiction Xs . Again, such a constraining sub-block may not be
unique.
Remark 2. Note that in this constraining sub-block we have two possibilities:
• Okr−1 ∩ Ikr ∩ O jp = ∅, and then in particular Okr−1 ∩ O jp = ∅. Then X is a predecessor of a node with more than one
parent, and {k2, . . . ,kr−1,kr, jp} would also be a constraining sub-block for X (see an example in Fig. 3).
• If Okr−1 ∩ Ikr ∩ O jp = ∅, then X is a predecessor of a dummy node in the cycle, and only precedes the actual nodes in
the cycle through this dummy node (see an example in Fig. 4).
The distinction between these two cases will simplify the proofs of our subsequent results.
As mentioned previously, the reason why we have deﬁned the notion of constraining sub-block is because it can be used
to determine the value of the variable X . This is stated in the following proposition:
Fig. 3. Constraining sub-block for X6 in the block associated to the source of contradiction, here a node with two predecessors.
Fig. 4. Constraining sub-block for X6 in the block associated to the source of contradiction, in this case a cycle.
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Proposition 3. Let us consider a block B Z , and any actual node X that belongs to B Z . Consider x ∈ X .
(1) If X is a source of contradiction in the block B Z , let j1 be an element of {1, . . . ,m} such that  ∈ O j1 . Then there are weakly
coherent previsions P1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , Pm(XOm |XIm ) such that any prevision P which is coherent with P j1 (XO j1 |XI j1 ) satisﬁes
P (x) = 1.
(2) If X is not a source of contradiction in B Z , let { j1, . . . , jk} be the indices of the previsions in a constraining sub-block for X .
Then there are P1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , Pm(XOm |XIm ) weakly coherent such that any prevision P coherent with P ji (XO ji |XI ji ) for
i = 1, . . . ,k satisﬁes P (x) = 1.
An important consequence of this proposition is that if two blocks happen to share an actual node, then it is possible
to create a contradiction at that node by forcing a certain value on it from one block, and a different value on it from the
other block. This suggests that the blocks that share some actual nodes should be considered as a single structure, rather
than as separate ones, in order to avoid contradictions; this is the reason for the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 14. Call superblock of a coherence graph, any union of all the blocks that share at least an actual node.
Fig. 5 displays the three different blocks of the coherence graph under consideration: the block for X7, the block for X8,
and the one for X14 (or, equivalently, for X10 or X13). The blocks for X7 and X8 have a node in common (X3), so their union
is in a superblock, also shown in the ﬁgure. The other superblock in the graph is just BX14 .
Observe that there can be many conﬁgurations of blocks in a superblock: a superblock can be made up of a single block;
if it is made up of more than one block, it may be the case that some blocks coincide (for instance BX14 coincides with
BX10 and BX13 ), that one of them is included in another, or that two of them share only some nodes (as BX7 and BX8 in the
same ﬁgure).
It is useful to make two observations at this point. The ﬁrst is that the intuition behind the notion of superblock made
up by different blocks is to delimit the joint area of inﬂuence of multiple sources of contradictions that belong to different
blocks connected by some actual nodes. The second is more formal and concerns the actual nodes of different blocks and
their relation with superblocks: in fact, for any block B Z we can consider the set AZ :=⋃i∈B Z (Ii ∪ O i) of the actual nodes
involved in B Z ; then, if AZ1 ∩ AZ2 = ∅, B Z1 and B Z2 belong to the same superblock. It follows from this that if we consider
two different superblocks B1 and B2, then (Ii ∪ O i) ∩ (I j ∪ O j) = ∅ for any i ∈ B1, j ∈ B2.
Now we use the notion of superblock in order to build a partition of the dummy nodes. The point here is that, similarly
to the case of blocks, sources of contradictions can extend their inﬂuence to every actual node in a superblock under an
opportune deﬁnition of the lower previsions involved. Because of this, it is not possible to prove the coherence of the
lower previsions in a superblock by simply inspecting the coherence graph: to prove it, it is necessary to know something
more than the bare collection template. It follows that superblocks are a kind of core entities in that we cannot prove
the coherence of a collection template without ﬁrst being able to prove the coherence of the lower previsions in each
superblock. Those core entities constitute the elements of the partition deﬁned below, together with the lower previsions
that do not belong to any superblock.
Deﬁnition 15. Call minimal partition of the dummy nodes in a coherence graph, the partition whose elements are the sets of
dummy nodes in each superblock, and the singletons made up of the remaining dummy nodes. The corresponding partition
of {1, . . . ,m} is denoted by B and is simply called the minimal partition.
Note that B refers also to a partition of the related collection template, given the one-to-one correspondence between
dummy nodes and lower prevision templates. With respect to the graph in Fig. 5, we obtain the following partition of the
related collection template:
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P1(X1), P2(X4|X1), P4(X7|X2), P5(X7|X3), P6(X8|X3), P7(X8|X4)
}
,{















P14(X15, X16|X9, X12, X13)
}}
.
Moreover, note that for A1-representable collection templates, the minimal partition is entirely made up of singletons,
because their coherence graph has no sources of contradiction, and has therefore m elements.
We conclude this section by remarking that if we consider B1, B2 in the minimal partition with |B1| > 1, |B2| = 1, i.e.,
such that B1 is associated to a superblock and B2 to an A1 component of the coherence graph, we must have O i∩(I j∪O j) =
∅ for any i ∈ B2, j ∈ B1: if O i ∩ O j = ∅ we have a node with more than one parent, and i should belong to the associated
superblock; and if O i ∩ I j = ∅ then i would be a predecessor of j, which is a predecessor of a source of contradiction, and
therefore i should be in the same block as j. Nevertheless, we may have I i ∩ (I j ∪ O j) = ∅ for some j ∈ B1. This will be
important in the proofs of the results we formulate in the next section.
6. Coherence graphs as tools to prove coherence
This section formally relates the graphical notions introduced in the previous section with the notions of weak and
strong coherence, and doing so gives the most important results of this paper.
In particular, the following theorem gives us conditions under which the coherence of some subsets of a collection of
conditional lower previsions implies the coherence of all the elements in the collection. It shows that it is suﬃcient that
the conditional lower previsions whose indices belong to the same element in B be coherent.
Theorem 2. Let {P1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , P m(XOm |XIm )} be a collection of separately coherent conditional lower previsions, and let
B be their associated minimal partition. If {P j(XO j |XI j )} j∈B are coherent for any B ∈ B, then the conditional lower previsions{P1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , P m(XOm |XIm )} are coherent.
The intuition behind the proof of the theorem, which we include in Appendix A, is the following. We exploit the prop-
erties of the coherence graph to create a total order on a set of coherent lower previsions tightly related to our collection
template. That order allows us to use the generalisation of the marginal extension theorem established in [23] to show that
the lower previsions in that set are coherent, and from this to derive the coherence of P1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , P m(XOm |XIm ).
It is easy to see that a similar result holds when we work with weak coherence instead of coherence:
Theorem 3. Let {P1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , P m(XOm |XIm )} be a collection of separately coherent conditional lower previsions such that for
any B ∈ B, {P j(XO j |XI j )} j∈B are weakly coherent. Then {P1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , P m(XOm |XIm )} are weakly coherent.
Next, we investigate in which sense the partition B given by Deﬁnition 15 is minimal. For this, we should like to know
if there are other partitions of {1, . . . ,m} that we can use for the same end, meaning that the coherence of the conditional
lower previsions within each of the elements of the partition guarantees the coherence of the collection template.
A ﬁrst positive result in that respect is that the partition B is indeed minimal when we are studying the problem for
weak coherence:
Theorem 4. Let B′ be a partition of {1, . . . ,m}, and assume that, for any B ′ in B′ , {P j(XO j |XI j )} j∈B ′ are weakly coherent. Then this
implies the weak coherence of {P1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , P m(XOm |XIm )} if and only if B is ﬁner than B′ .
The suﬃciency part in this proposition is actually Theorem 3. The idea for the necessity part is to show that, when the
necessary condition fails, we can create conditional linear previsions P1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , Pm(XOm |XIm ) that are not weakly
coherent and yet for all B ′ in B′ , {P j(XO j |XI j )} j∈B ′ are weakly coherent.
However, a similar result to Theorem 4 does not apply for coherence: there are instances of collection templates where
the coherence within the elements of a partition which is not coarser than B guarantees the coherence of all of them. One
such case is given in the following example.
Example 2. Let us consider the collection template associated to the conditional lower previsions {P1(X1), P2(X2|X1),
P3(X2, X3|X1)}. Its coherence graph is given in Fig. 6, and the minimal partition B associated to that graph is {1,2,3}.
However, we can deduce the coherence of the collection template with a smaller subset. For this, let us show that the co-
herence of P2(X2|X1), P3(X2, X3|X1) implies (actually, it is equivalent to the fact) that for any X1 × X2-measurable gamble
f0 and for any x1 ∈ X1,
P2( f0|x1) = P3( f0|x1). (6)
To see this, apply Eq. (4) to P2(X2|X1) and P3(X2, X3|X1) using j0 := 2, z0 := x1 ∈ X1, f2 := 0, and f3 := f0I{x }×X :1 {2,3}














f0 − P3( f0|x1) − f0 + P2( f0|x1)
]
= −P3( f0|x1) + P2( f0|x1),
i.e., P2( f0|x1)  P3( f0|x1). The converse inequality, P2( f0|x1)  P3( f0|x1), follows by repeating the same argument with
j0 := 3, z0 := x1, f2 := f0I{x1}×X2 and f3 := 0.
At this point, assume that P2(X2|X1), P3(X2, X3|X1) are coherent, and hence that Eq. (6) holds. Consider the expression
used to prove the coherence of the previsions P1(X1), P2(X2|X1), and P3(X2, X3|X1): i.e.,{
G1( f1) + G2( f2|X1) + G3( f3|X1) − G j0 ( f0|x1) if j0 ∈ {2,3}
G1( f1) + G2( f2|X1) + G3( f3|X1) − G j0 ( f0) if j0 = 1,
for any f j ∈ K j , j = 1,2,3, j0 ∈ {1,2,3}, f0 ∈ K j0 and x1 ∈ X1; verify that G2 can be replaced by G3 under (6). As a
result, we obtain that the conditional lower previsions P1(X1), P2(X2|X1) and P3(X2, X3|X1) are coherent if and only if
P1(X1), P3(X2, X3|X1) are. But P1(X1), P3(X2, X3|X1) are always coherent because of the marginal extension theorem [33,
Theorem 6.7.2], and so the coherence of P2(X2|X1), P3(X2, X3|X1) implies the coherence of the collection template.
It remains an open problem at this stage to determine a partition with the property that the coherence within each of
its elements guarantees the coherence of the collection template, and that is minimal in the sense that it is ﬁner than any
other partition with the same property.
In this respect, the most interesting particular case would be under which conditions this minimal partition is equal to
{{1}, . . . , {m}}, that is, when we can deduce the coherence of {P1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , P m(XOm |XIm )} from their separate coher-
ence. We can deduce from Theorem 2 that when the coherence graph associated to {P1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , P m(XOm |XIm )} is of
type A1, then the separate coherence of these previsions implies their coherence. Using Theorem 4, we can prove that being
of type A1 is also necessary for this property.
Proposition 4. Consider a collection {P1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , P m(XOm |XIm )} of separately coherent conditional lower previsions. The fol-
lowing are equivalent:
(1) The separate coherence of {P1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , P m(XOm |XIm )} implies their coherence.
(2) The separate coherence of {P1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , P m(XOm |XIm )} implies their weak coherence.
(3) The coherence graph of this collection template is of type A1.
We should like to conclude this section remarking that if the collection template is A1-representable, then we can give
the following sensitivity analysis interpretation:
Theorem 5. Consider a collection of separately coherent conditional lower previsions. If their coherence graph is A1, then these lower
previsions are lower envelopes of a family of coherent linear previsions.
Hence, when the coherence graph is A1, we can interpret our coherent conditional lower previsions as a model for the
imprecise knowledge of some precise coherent conditional linear previsions. The interest of this result lies in the fact that
the lower envelopes of a family of coherent conditional linear previsions are coherent conditional lower previsions, but the
converse does not hold in general: there exist instances of coherent conditional lower previsions that are not even domi-
nated by any family of coherent conditional linear previsions [33, Section 6.6.10].6 A suﬃcient condition for the converse to
6 The previsions in the example given in that section can be written in our language as P (X1, X2), P (X2|X1). Note that they both belong to the same
block, and consequently their coherence graph is not A1.
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then the coherent conditional lower previsions are also lower envelopes of coherent conditional linear previsions, no matter
the cardinality of the spaces.
7. An algorithm to ﬁnd the minimal partition
In order to exploit coherence graphs as tools to check coherence, one should be able to compute the minimal partition
of a coherence graph. This is what we set out to do in the following: we give an algorithm to ﬁnd the minimal partition
and then discuss its computational complexity, thus showing the eﬃciency of the algorithm.
The rationale behind the algorithm is very simple. We start a visit of the graph from each source of contradiction, go-
ing backwards with respect to the direction of the arrows, so as to identify the related block. This is done by a recursive
procedure that tags the nodes found in the visit, assigning different tags to blocks originated by different sources of contra-
diction. The only complication is that some blocks might have non-empty intersection, and as a consequence they should
be regarded as a single superblock. When this happens, the tags of the different blocks should be regarded as the same.
To this extent, we implement a data structure that acts as a dictionary, i.e., which maps the tags of the blocks in the same
superblock into a unique tag, referred to as the true tag, which can be regarded as the class of equivalence of those tags.
The dictionary is ﬁlled by a procedure during the visits of the graph every time a node is found at the intersection of two
or more blocks.
Below we describe the algorithm more precisely in a C-like language (as opposed to C, we assume that the ﬁrst element
of an array has index 1 to make the code simpler to read). To make things simpler, we assume that the nodes of the graph
have been re-indexed from 1 to m + n, where the ﬁrst m nodes are D1, . . . , Dm and the following ones are the actual nodes.
We also assume that, as a result of previous computations, the following global data structures are available:
• two integer numbers, m and n, corresponding to the number of dummy and actual nodes, respectively.
• An array called node, of size m + n, whose generic element node[i] is a structure that contains the following com-
ponents related to node i:
– an integer called node[i].nParents containing the number of parents of node i;
– an integer array called node[i].parent, of size node[i].nParents, containing the indexes of the parents of
node i;
– an integer called node[i].tag initialised to 0 to denote that node i is not tagged.
• An integer called nContradictions containing the number of actual nodes that are sources of contradictions.
• An integer array called contradiction, of size nContradictions, containing the indexes of the actual nodes that
are sources of contradictions.
• An integer array called minPartition, of size m, which implements the dictionary.
Fig. 7 reports the software code to ﬁnd the minimal partition based on such data structures.
The code has three procedures: findMinPartition, which is the main one; its subroutine findBlock, with param-
eters i and currentTag; and mergeBlocks, with parameters tagFound and currentTag, which is a subroutine of
findBlock.
The purpose of findMinPartition is to assign tags to the dummy nodes and ﬁll the array minPartition in such
a way that for any j1, j2 ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, j1 and j2 belong to the same element of the minimal partition if and only if the tags
minPartition[node[j1].tag] and minPartition[node[j2].tag] coincide.
findMinPartition works in two steps. In the ﬁrst, up to and including line 07, the procedure enumerates the
sources of contradiction and, when one is found that is not tagged, calls findBlock to tag it and all its predecessors, thus
identifying a block. findBlock also takes care, by means of mergeBlocks, to merge blocks with non-empty intersec-
tion into a superblock by properly ﬁlling the array minPartition, so that at line 08 of findMinPartition all the
superblocks have been identiﬁed. In the second step, from line 08 onwards, the procedure simply considers the dummy
nodes that are not in any superblock and tags them with new and increasing values of currentTag, thus identifying the
remaining elements of the minimal partition.
The way findBlock works is more complicated. Its main purpose is to tag the actual node i and all its predecessors
by currentTag in a recursive way. It may happen that some of the nodes found during the visit in the graph are already
tagged (this happens at line 25 if the node found is dummy and at line 29 if it is actual). In this case, if the true tag found
is different from the current one, findBlock calls mergeBlocks to merge the two blocks related to the two different
tags. mergeBlocks does so by identifying the tags with each other.
Let us recall at this point that to be really in the condition of computing the minimal partition, we should also have
methods to ﬁll the global data structures mentioned at the beginning of this section, before running findMinPartition.
These methods are actually trivial to implement apart from the one that solves the problem of identifying the actual nodes
involved in cycles.
A key observation to address such a problem is that a node belongs (at least) to a cycle in a directed graph if and only if
it belongs to a non-trivial strong component of the graph. This implies that identifying the strong components enables one to
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02 int currentTag=0, i, l;
03 for(l=1;l<=nContradictions;++l) // enumerate sources of contradiction
04 if(!node[contradiction[l]].tag){ // contradiction not tagged yet?
05 findBlock(contradiction[l],++currentTag); // give tag to nodes in block
06 minPartition[currentTag]=currentTag; // update dictionary
07 }
08 for(i=1;i<=m;++i) // enumerate dummy nodes
09 if(!node[i].tag){ // that are not tagged, i.e., not in any superblock
10 node[i].tag=++currentTag; // give (newly created) tag




15 void findBlock(int i, int currentTag){ // identify block for given actual node
16 int j, k;
17 if(!node[i].tag){ // node not tagged yet?
18 node[i].tag=currentTag; // give tag
19 for(j=1;j<=node[i].nParents;++j) // enumerate parents
20 if(!node[node[i].parent[j]].tag){ // parent not tagged yet?
21 node[node[i].parent[j]].tag=currentTag; // tag it
22 for(k=1;k<=node[node[i].parent[j]].nParents;++k) // enumerate its parents
23 findBlock(node[node[i].parent[j]].parent[k],currentTag); // recursion
24 }else if(minPartition[node[node[i].parent[j]].tag]!=currentTag) // tagged?
25 mergeBlocks(minPartition[node[node[i].parent[j]].tag],currentTag); // merge
26 }else if(minPartition[node[i].tag]!=currentTag) // (already) tagged?
27 mergeBlocks(minPartition[node[i].tag],currentTag); // merge (the two blocks)
28 }
29
30 void mergeBlocks(int tagFound, int currentTag){ // two tags must become one
31 int l;
32 for(l=1;l<currentTag;++l) // enumerate existing (true) tags
33 if(minPartition[l]==tagFound) // any tag ‘l’ previously mapped into ‘tagfound’
34 minPartition[l]=currentTag; // is now mapped into ‘currentTag’
35 }
Fig. 7. The software code in C-like language to ﬁnd the minimal partition of a coherence graph.
ﬁnd the actual nodes involved in at least a cycle. Fortunately, the task of identifying the strong components is well known
and eﬃciently tackled by Tarjan’s algorithm in [29], so that also this part of the problem can be addressed easily.
The complexity of the overall procedures, including the methods to ﬁll the global data structures, is given in the following
theorem.
Theorem 6. The worst-case complexity to compute the minimal partition using the procedures in Fig. 7 is bounded by O (m+n+m ·n).
Note that this bound is derived under the implicit assumption that the input of the problem is a coherence graph, but
usually one would rather start with a collection template. This is not problematic because the lower prevision templates
in a collection are in one-to-one correspondence with the D-structures of the corresponding coherence graph, as stated in
Section 5, so that converting a collection template into a coherence graph takes linear time and thus it does not increase
the complexity bound derived above.
8. Applications
Now that the main results of this paper have been presented, we can show how they naturally relate with three impor-
tant models and tools well known in artiﬁcial intelligence. In Section 8.1 we shall use our results to prove for the ﬁrst time
the coherence, to a large extent, of the graphical models called Bayesian and credal networks. In Section 8.2, we shall estab-
lish a tight relationship between weak coherence and the so-called compatibility problem: i.e., checking whether a number
of assessments admits a compatible joint probabilistic model. In this case, we shall show that coherence graphs allow us
to optimally decompose a compatibility problems into smaller ones, for a very general version of the problem. Finally, in
Section 8.3, we focus on a recently proposed coherence-based version of probabilistic satisﬁability that enhances and extends
similar problems in probabilistic logic. In this case we ﬁrst give new results that detail the connection between these more
traditional approaches and Walley’s theory. Then we show that coherence graphs can be used also in this case to decompose
some important instances of probabilistic satisﬁability into smaller ones.
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Let us focus on proving the coherence of the graphical models called Bayesian nets and their extension to imprecise
probability called credal nets.
Although it may seem surprising at ﬁrst, these models have not been shown yet to be coherent in a strong sense. What
is well known is that these models give rise to a joint coherent lower prevision (in our language, this means that the
assessments that make up those models are pairwise coherent with such a joint). For example, a Bayesian net is equivalent
to a joint mass (or density) function over the considered variables; a credal net is equivalent to a closed convex set of such
joint mass functions (the joint coherent lower prevision is the lower envelope of the expectations computed from those
mass functions). This is often implicitly taken as evidence that the models under consideration are self consistent. But, as
we have shown in Theorem 1, the existence of such a joint is only equivalent to weak coherence; and weak coherence
leaves room to inconsistencies so that Bayesian and credal nets could still express inconsistent beliefs, for all we know.
In Section 8.1.2 we show that this is not the case as the mentioned models satisfy Walley’s notion of strong coherence.
We do this using coherence graphs and some additional developments introduced in Section 8.1.1 that are needed to con-
nect coherence graphs with the so-called notion of strong product, a generalisation of stochastic independence to imprecise
probability. The connection is necessary as the strong product underlies the models under consideration. Finally, in Sec-
tion 8.1.3 we discuss some extensions of the presented results to more general models of credal nets and also to some
major statistical applications.
8.1.1. Relating A1 graphs to the strong product
In this section we summarise some results that connect A1 graphs with a notion of probabilistic independence called
strong independence (see [8,24]) and that have been introduced in [37].
We start with a lemma7 that shows that A1 graphs naturally entail a notion of order of the corresponding lower previ-
sions: in particular, that it is possible to permute the indexes of the lower previsions in such a way that the only admissible
paths between two dummy nodes are those in which the index of the origin precedes that of the destination.8
Lemma 1. (See [37, Lemma 1].) If the coherence graph associated to the collection template {P1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , P m(XOm |XIm )} is A1,
then we may assume without loss of generality that for any k = 1, . . . ,m, Ok ∩ (⋃k−1i=1 Ii) = ∅.
Note that this result depends only on the properties of the coherence graph, and therefore it is applicable also when
dealing with precise conditional previsions.
Now we restrict the attention to the special case of A1 graphs originated by collections of separately coherent conditional
lower previsions such that {O 1, . . . , Om} forms a partition of {1, . . . ,n}. This means that for each variable there is exactly
one lower prevision expressing beliefs about it. Let us call this type of graphs A1+ . From Lemma 1, if a collection template
{P1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , P m(XOm |XIm )} is A1+-representable, we can assume without loss of generality that I1 = ∅. Let us deﬁne
A1 := ∅, A j :=⋃ j−1i=1 (Ii ∪ O i) for j = 2, . . . ,m+ 1, and for j = 1, . . . ,m let P ′j(XO j |XA j∪I j ) be given on the set H j of XA j+1 -
measurable gambles by
P ′j( f |z) := P j
(
f (z, ·)|πI j (z)
)
for any z ∈ XA j∪I j and any f ∈ H j . Since P j(XO j |XI j ) is separately coherent for j = 1, . . . ,m, so is P ′j(XO j |XA j∪I j ). More-
over, thanks to Lemma 1 and the requirement that {O 1, . . . , Om} forms a partition of {1, . . . ,n}, the sets of indices of
the conditioning variables in the previsions P ′1(XO 1), . . . , P ′m(XOm |XAm∪Im ) form an increasing sequence and hence they
satisfy the hypotheses of the generalised marginal extension theorem established in [23, Theorem 4]. As a consequence,
P ′1(XO 1), . . . , P ′m(XOm |XAm∪Im ) are also coherent.
A similar reasoning shows that if we take for j = 1, . . . ,m a conditional linear prevision P ′j(XO j |XA j∪I j ) on the set H j
that dominates P ′j(XO j |XA j∪I j ), then P ′1(XO 1), . . . , P ′m(XOm |XAm∪Im ) are jointly coherent. Moreover, taking into account that
{O 1, . . . , Om} is a partition of {1, . . . ,n}, Theorem 3 in Ref. [23] implies that the only prevision P on X n which is coherent
with the assessments P ′1(XO 1), . . . , P ′m(XOm |XAm∪Im ) is











In other words, P ′1(XO 1), . . . , P ′m(XOm |XAm∪Im ) give rise to a unique joint lower prevision. When X1, . . . ,Xn are ﬁnite, it






πO j (x)|πA j∪I j (x)
)
. (8)
At this point we are ready to give the deﬁnition of lower envelope model.
7 This lemma will be used not only in this section but also in the proofs of Appendix A for other reasons, through Lemma 6.
8 This order notion is similar to the graph-theoretic notion of topological ordering, but here it is applied only to the dummy nodes.
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is s.t. for all j = 1, . . . ,m, Pλ(XO j |XA j∪I j ) dominates P ′j(XO j |XA j∪I j ) and also minλ∈Λ Pλ(XO j |XA j∪I j ) = P ′j(XO j |XA j∪I j ).
The coherent lower prevision P deﬁned as P := minλ∈Λ Pλ , where Pλ is the coherent prevision determined by
Pλ(XO 1), . . . , Pλ(XOm |XAm∪Im ) and Eq. (7), is called a lower envelope model.
Intuitively, a lower envelope model is a joint lower prevision that is built out of a number of conditional and uncondi-
tional assessments. The interest in lower envelope models arises because it is a very common practise to build joint models
out of smaller conditional and unconditional ones, and then to use the joint model to draw some conclusions. Lower en-
velope models abstract this procedure of constructing joint models in the general case of coherent lower previsions. As
particular cases of lower envelope models, we can consider the following:
(1) If for each j = 1, . . . ,m we consider all the Pλ(XO j |XA j∪I j ) in the set M(P ′j(XO j |XA j∪I j )), then the lower prevision P
is the marginal extension of P ′1(XO 1), . . . , P ′m(XOm |XAm∪Im ).
(2) If for j = 1, . . . ,m we take all the Pλ(XO j |XA j∪I j ) in the set of extreme points of M(P ′j(XO j |XA j∪I j )), with the ad-
ditional requirement that Pλ(XO j |z) = Pλ(XO j |z′) if πI j (z) = πI j (z′), then the lower envelope model P is called the
strong product of P1(XO 1), . . . , P m(XOm |XIm ).
The marginal extension represents the most conservative lower envelope model built out of the assessments deﬁned in (7).
The strong product is also the most conservative lower envelope model built out of those assessments with the additional
assumption of strong independence (see for instance [37] for additional information).
Theorem 7. (See [37, Theorem 2].) Consider an A1+-representable collection template {P1(XO 1), . . . , P m(XOm |XIm )}, and let P be a
lower envelope model associated to it. Then P , P1(XO 1), . . . , P m(XOm |XIm ) are coherent.
Note that this result is concerned with the original assessments, not with those deﬁned in (7). In particular, it implies
that it is always coherent to build the strong product out of an A1+-representable collection. This is the main tool that we
shall use in the following.
8.1.2. Bayesian and credal networks
A Bayesian net [27] is made of a directed acyclic graph whose nodes are in one-to-one correspondence with the variables
X1, . . . , Xn (a well-known example of Bayesian net is given in Fig. 8). The arcs of the graph represent stochastic indepen-
dences among the variables by means of the so-called Markov condition: i.e., the fact that a variable is independent of its
non-descendant non-parents given its parents. Let X j be the generic node in the net, and denote by I j the set of indexes of
its parents. Let us assume that the variables take values on ﬁnite spaces. In this case each node of the network is associated
with a set of conditional mass functions that in our language correspond to the conditional linear previsions P j(X j|XI j ).
Fig. 8. The Asia network: a model of an artiﬁcial medical problem related to the presence of dyspnea. The nodes correspond to variables (with names in
parentheses), which are all 0–1 valued in this example.
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Note also that m = n with Bayesian nets. Specifying a Bayesian net is equivalent, through the Markov condition, to specifying






π j(x)|πI j (x)
)
, x ∈ X n. (9)
Credal networks are an extension of Bayesian nets to imprecise probabilities [8]. The extension is achieved, in the case
of the so-called separately speciﬁed credal nets, about which we focus, by allowing the generic node X j to replace each of
its mass functions with the closed convex hull of a ﬁnite number of conditional mass functions. In other words, the linear
prevision P j(X j|XI j ) is replaced by a coherent lower prevision P j(X j|XI j ) for all the nodes X j in the net. As an example,
the Asia network can be turned into a credal net by replacing each of its local conditional probabilities with a probability
interval, as a closed convex set of mass functions is equivalent to a probability interval in the case of a binary variable.
A credal net is equivalent to a set of Bayesian nets: if one chooses a precise mass function in each local closed convex
set of the net, the credal net becomes a Bayesian net that is ‘compatible’ with the credal net. In the language of coherent
lower previsions this means that the graph, together with the choice of a linear prevision P j(X j|XI j ) P j(X j |XI j ) at node
X j , for all j = 1, . . . ,n, is a Bayesian net. Therefore, a credal net can be regarded as the set of Bayesian nets originated by
choosing the above dominating linear previsions in all the possible ways. Call P the set of joint mass functions obtained
applying Eq. (9) to each compatible Bayesian net.
Credal nets are rendered consistent with Walley’s theory of coherent lower previsions using the notion of strong extension,
deﬁned as
K (P) := CH(P),
where the symbol CH denotes the operation of taking the closed convex hull. Since K (P) is convex, it has extreme points,
i.e., mass functions in K (P) that cannot be expressed as convex combinations of other ones in K (P). Let us denote the
set of extreme points by ext(K (P)). Usually, the deﬁnition of credal networks requires that such a subset is ﬁnite. It is
well known that in this case ext(K (P)) ⊆ P ; this means that the extreme points correspond to a subset of the compatible
Bayesian nets. For this reason, a credal net is usually regarded as equivalent to a ﬁnite set of Bayesian nets even if P has
inﬁnitely many elements. Note also that a Bayesian net is a special case of credal net. In such a case, the strong extension
is a singleton containing the joint mass function coded by the Bayesian net through Eq. (9).
The strong extension is nothing else but an equivalent representation of a coherent lower prevision P (X1, . . . , Xn), from
which the connection with Walley’s theory. To enforce this connection, inferences with credal nets are usually made with
respect to the strong extension rather than the initial set P . This should not be controversial because doing inference with
credal nets is usually taken to be the computation of lower and upper posterior expectations; and these stay the same
irrespective of the fact that one uses P , K (P) or ext(K (P)).
At this point we are ready to show that credal nets, and consequently Bayesian nets, are coherent models. To this aim,
it is suﬃcient to show that a credal net leads to an A1+ coherence graph (see Fig. 9 for an example) and that the strong
extension of a credal net coincides with the strong product of the related coherence graph, as in the next theorem.
Theorem 8. The local conditional lower previsions P1(X1|XI1), . . . , P n(Xn|XIn ) of a credal network are A1+-representable. Their
strong product coincides with the strong extension of the network.
We can then apply Theorem 7 in a straightforward way to obtain the wanted result as an immediate corollary of the
previous theorem.
9 Note that in Expression (9) the symbol π refers to the projection operator from Deﬁnition 1, and it should not be confused with the symbol used to
denote the parents of a node in a Bayesian network.
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its strong extension. Then P1(X1|XI1), . . . , P n(Xn|XIn ) and P (X1, . . . , Xn) are coherent.
8.1.3. Some concluding remarks
There are at least two reasons that make Corollary 2 important. One is that credal and Bayesian nets are very general and
important models, and it is important to know that they are coherent, both for theoretical and practical reasons. Actually,
exploiting tools presented elsewhere [37], it is possible also to give a stronger result: that coherence is preserved even
under the so-called updating of a credal net, under very general conditions. This means that it is not possible to produce
inconsistencies by building and repeatedly using a credal net.
The second reason is the (implicit) generality of the theorem. Remember that there are two basic limitations on the
traditional deﬁnition of credal nets, on which we have focused so far: the strong extension is assumed to have a ﬁnite
number of extreme points; and the variables to take ﬁnitely many possible values. Both are related to the deﬁnition of
strong extension and hence it is useful, and even necessary for the second question, to extend such a deﬁnition. What
seems to be the natural way to extend it, in our view, is just adopting in its place the deﬁnition of strong product given
in Section 8.1.1. This choice allows us to propose, for the ﬁrst time, a deﬁnition of credal nets for general spaces; moreover,
it allows us, through Theorems 7 and 8, to immediately prove the coherence of credal nets in the general case (i.e., any
kind of possibility spaces involved, and possibly inﬁnitely many extreme points in the generalised strong extension), which
appears to be an important outcome.
More generally speaking, we should like to point out that the approach used to prove the coherence of credal nets can be
replayed with opportune changes also in other important contexts. For example, some recent work [37] has again exploited
coherence graphs together with the strong product to prove the coherence of some very general statistical models: it has
been shown that imprecise-probability based forms of statistical inference, such as some generalised parametric inference
and pattern classiﬁcation, are coherent. These models generalise Bayesian inference by using sets of priors to model prior
knowledge (which can also correspond to a condition of near-ignorance) and use sets of likelihood functions to model very
ﬂexibly the possible presence of a process responsible for missing values. Also in this case, coherence graphs are a key tool
to prove in a relatively easy way the coherence of the mentioned models, despite their generality and complexity.
A ﬁnal point seems to be particularly worth of interest: both in the statistical case and with credal nets, the coherence
graphs naturally originated are only of type A1. Remember that A1 graphs lead to coherence irrespective of the numbers that
make up the related lower previsions (provided that they are separately coherent); in other words, in the case of A1 graphs
coherence is a structural component of the collection. With more general graphs this is not necessarily the case: the related
collection might no longer be coherent with very small changes in the numbers making up the lower previsions, in a way
that might make the check of coherence problematic due to numerical instabilities. Therefore, it is interesting to observe
that some of the most commonly used models in artiﬁcial intelligence and statistics have naturally been selected with the
property that their coherence is relatively insensitive to the mentioned instabilities. On the other hand, this conﬁrms the
importance of A1 graphs.
8.2. Compatibility of marginal and conditional probabilistic assessments
The results in this paper allow us to provide new insight and solutions to the problem of the compatibility of a collection
of marginal and conditional previsions. This problem has received a long-standing interest in the literature, since the seminal
works by Boole [6], Hoeffding [16], Fréchet [14] and Vorobev [32]. See [9] and the references therein for recent works in
the subject. It is related via Sklar’s theorem to the notion of copulas [28], which has applications in economics [25].
Consider variables X1, . . . , Xn taking values in respective sets X1, . . . ,Xn . Consider I j, O j ⊆ {1, . . . ,n} such that I j ∩
O j = ∅, for j = 1, . . . ,m, and conditional lower previsions P j(XO j |XI j ) for j = 1, . . . ,m. As we have mentioned before,
P j(XO j |XI j ) models the information that the variable XI j := (Xi)i∈I j provides about the variable XO j := (Xi)i∈O j . If in
particular I j = ∅, then P j(XO j ) is simply the marginal information that we have about the variable XO j .
We formulate the compatibility problem, in a very general way, as studying whether there is an extension P on X n of
the (marginal and conditional) lower previsions in a collection {P1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , P m(XOm |XIm )}. In the case of marginal
lower previsions, this means obviously that P is an extension of them to the set of all gambles. The situation for conditional
lower previsions is a bit more involved: we shall interpret compatibility of P and P (XO |XI ) as coherence of these two lower
previsions, in the sense considered throughout this paper (note that, as we have remarked in Section 2, in the particular
case of a conditional and an unconditional assessment weak and strong coherence are equivalent).
Note that the study we make for lower previsions is of course also valid for the particular case where the assessments are
precise, that is, when we have linear conditional and unconditional previsions P j(XO j |XI j ), j = 1, . . . ,m. In such a case, we
look for a precise joint, that is, for a linear prevision which is compatible with all these assessments. Coherence implies now
that (and, in the ﬁnite case, is equivalent to the fact) that the joint P induces all the conditionals by means of Bayes’ rule
when conditioning on an event of positive probability (see for instance [2, Chapter 10]). The more traditional formulation of
the problem is a special case of the previous formulation obtained by restricting the attention to marginal previsions only,
and amounts to study whether there is a compatible joint P on X n whose O j-marginal is P (XO j ), for j = 1, . . . ,m.
Our ﬁrst, and important, result for the general compatibility problem is just Theorem 1 (see also Remark 1): from this
theorem, we know that the lower previsions P1(XO 1 |XI1), . . ., P m(XOm |XIm ) are compatible if and only if they are weakly
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work that has given such a characterisation in the general case that we consider, although a similar result has been given
in [20] for the particular situation made of unconditional linear previsions, and of ﬁnite sets X1, . . . ,Xn .
Theorem 1 is a key result also because it allows us to exploit in a direct way the outcomes from this paper, obtained
for weak coherence, in the case of compatibility problems. For instance, we can use Proposition 4 to deduce that weak
coherence, and hence compatibility, is implied by the separate coherence of P1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , P m(XOm |XIm ) alone (i.e.,
without any other information about the numbers that make up the previsions) if and only if the coherence graph associated
to this collection template is A1.10 This means that if a collection of lower previsions is A1-representable, we immediately
know that they are compatible; this gives us a graphical criterion that is suﬃcient for compatibility. The criterion becomes
easier, and more obvious, if we focus on the simpler compatibility problem made only of unconditional lower previsions. In
this case, the coherence graph cannot possess cycles; hence, it will be A1 if and only if there are no actual nodes with more
than one parent, which in turn means that the sets {O 1, . . . , Om} must be pairwise disjoint.
The above graphical criteria may of course not be met in practice; in this case one should study the speciﬁc problem at
hand in order to be able to check compatibility. Yet, without going into the detail of the numbers that make up the lower
previsions, one can still take advantage of coherence graphs to optimally decompose a compatibility problem into simpler
ones, i.e., those related to the subsets of the graph’s minimal partition. Actually, this is the situation in which coherence
graphs may prove to be more helpful, by having the potential to greatly reduce the complexity of the original task. Also, in
our knowledge, this appears to be quite an original avenue for compatibility problems.
Let us stress also that these results are very general compared to the ones established in the classical works for the com-
patibility problem, because they can be applied to marginal and conditional lower previsions, instead of linear. Hence, they
are also valid in situations of ambiguous or scarce information, where the use a precise probability model is not possible
(or adequate). Furthermore, in the case of inﬁnite spaces X1, . . . ,Xn , our work is based on ﬁnitely additive probabilities on
the class of all subsets of XI j∪O j , for j = 1, . . . ,m, which allows us to avoid topological and measurability assumptions on
the domains.
8.3. Coherence-based probabilistic satisﬁability
The compatibility problem is close to a different and well-known problem called probabilistic satisﬁability [15,17]. A major
difference is that latter is usually deﬁned only relative to variables with ﬁnite support (it is often deﬁned only with respect
to events). In the following we shall therefore make this assumption, too.
Let us consider precise probabilities for a moment. In this case, probabilistic satisﬁability consists in checking whether a
number of precise conditional and unconditional probabilities is consistent with a joint. This is usually done via algorithms
based on linear programming. Probabilistic satisﬁability is tightly related to probabilistic logic [26]. In fact, the above check
is often a ﬁrst necessary step to be able to compute, again using linear programming, the probabilistic implications of the
initial assessments on new events, which is the goal of probabilistic logic.
Probabilistic satisﬁability has been extended to deal also with imprecise probabilistic assessments, and even with lower
and upper previsions in some recent work by Walley, Pelessoni and Vicig [34] (from now on we refer to this paper by WPV
for short). This work is somewhat atypical as it is based on a coherence-based view of probability rarely employed (another
approach in a similar spirit is [5]) in probabilistic logic. And yet the authors of that paper show that relying on coherence
is just the key to ﬁx some of the problems of probabilistic logic and to develop truly general and powerful methods. These
two characteristics make of WPV a natural candidate to bridge our results and probabilistic satisﬁability.
To this aim, in Section 8.3.1 we ﬁrst consider WPV in some detail. In particular, we consider the speciﬁc notions of
consistency used there, and give new results that make it easy to move back and forth from those notions and the more
traditional ones used in probabilistic logic. Moreover, we extend some of the theory for coherence graphs to show that
they can decompose, in Section 8.3.2, some instances of the consistency problem of WPV into smaller ones. This is an
important result because probabilistic satisﬁability is an NP-hard problem [5]; when coherence graphs allow for reducing
one such problem into smaller ones, we immediately obtain the possibility to solve bigger problem instances than it was
possible before. (For an alternative, and possibly complementary approach, see [3]; in this case the focus is on heuristic
considerations to reduce the computational burden.)
8.3.1. Suﬃcient conditions for avoiding partial and uniform sure loss
The WPV work is made of a ﬁrst part related to the satisﬁability problem and a second one for the extension of the
assessments to new events or variables. In the language of that paper, the ﬁrst problem is one of checking whether the
assessments avoid uniform loss; the second is the natural extension of the assessments.
These notions are taken from the seminal work of Williams [35] about lower previsions. In the setup that we shall
consider, they are equivalent to the related ones from Walley [33, Section 7.1]. From this, it follows that avoiding uniform
10 Moreover, we have proven that when the coherence graph of the collection template is of type A1, we not only deduce that these previsions are weakly
coherent, but also that they are (strongly) coherent. This allows us to give them a behavioural interpretation in terms of betting rates, as in the works by
Walley [33] and de Finetti [13], and connects the compatibility problem naturally with decision making.
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we are considering, avoiding uniform loss is equivalent to the notion of avoiding partial loss, introduced in Section 2. The
conclusion follows because coherence is indeed deﬁned as a strengthening of avoiding partial loss.
At ﬁrst it may look surprising that WPV focuses on a consistency notion that, being weaker than coherence, leaves
room to inconsistencies in the original assessments. The reason is related to the second part of that work, i.e., the natural
extension. Walley shows that for the natural extension to be well deﬁned, it is necessary that the original assessments
avoid partial loss. Remember that the natural extension is a procedure that allows one to compute the (tight) probabilistic
implications of the original assessments on any new event or gamble, and in particular even on the original ones themselves.
In this case such a procedure automatically corrects the possible inconsistencies left among the original assessments, making
them (strongly) coherent. In WPV coherence is, in other words, a byproduct of the natural extension.
WPV discusses at different points the relationship with former approaches, especially those based on probabilistic logic,
pointing to some of their problems. Here the key to understand the difference between the approaches is in the different
notion of loss used. Unlike WPV, which is based on avoiding uniform loss (i.e., avoiding partial loss), most of the other
approaches are based on the weaker notion of avoiding uniform sure loss given in Deﬁnition 3. To make the connection with
the mentioned approaches more explicit, in the following proposition we give an equivalent formulation of avoiding uniform
sure loss based on the existence of dominating conditional lower previsions which are weakly coherent.
Proposition 5. Let {P1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , P m(XOm |XIm )} be a collection of separately coherent conditional lower previsions. If all the
spaces X1, . . . ,Xn are ﬁnite, then they avoid uniform sure loss if and only if there exist weakly coherent dominating conditional linear
previsions {P1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , Pm(XOm |XIm )}.
This proposition can be easily given an intuitive meaning. The existence of dominating linear previsions means that
there must be precise probabilities in the feasible set determined by the constraints (on conditional and unconditional
probabilities) that deﬁne a satisﬁability problem; in other words, the feasible set must be non-empty. But this is not enough:
the fact that they are weakly coherent means, through Theorem 1 and Remark 1, that there must be a joint mass function
from which one can derive, via Bayes’ rule and marginalisations, those precise probabilities. Stated differently, if we use a
number of conditional lower previsions as means to express bounds on conditional probabilities, the property of avoiding
uniform sure loss is equivalent to the existence of a joint mass function that satisﬁes all these bounds. This should make
it clear that avoiding uniform sure loss is just the implicit condition that the more traditional approaches to probabilistic
satisﬁability try to test (these questions are discussed at some length in [34, Section 2.4]).
There is a further point of interest. It is possible to show that in a probabilistic satisﬁability problem, avoiding uniform
loss and avoiding uniform sure loss coincide if the (lower) probabilities of all the involved conditioning events are positive.
This is related to the existence of the joint mass function mentioned above: in fact, since the joint mass function must be
related to the conditional assessments of the problem via Bayes’ rule, it turns out that there is no relation when Bayes’ rule
cannot be applied, i.e., when the (lower) probability of a conditioning event is zero. It follows that avoiding uniform sure
loss does not capture speciﬁc inconsistencies in the original assessments that arise on top of those zero probabilities (such
as in the example presented in the Introduction). This is, in particular, a source of criticism in WPV of the approaches based
on avoiding uniform sure loss (see [34, Section 3.7] for a discussion about this point). It is indeed a considerable feature
of the WPV approach that it does not suffer for these kinds of inconsistencies, nor can draw wrong conclusions because of
them.11
At this point that we have some insight about the WPV approach and its relationship with ours and others, we can move
to work more closely on the relationship between coherence graphs and WPV. Our ﬁnal aim is to be able to use coherence
graphs to simplify the check of avoiding uniform loss in WPV. The following result is what we need to reach our goal.
Theorem 9. Let {P1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , P m(XOm |XIm )} be a collection of separately coherent conditional lower previsions, and let B be
their associated minimal partition, given by Deﬁnition 15.
(1) If {P j(XO j |XI j )} j∈B avoid partial loss for any B ∈ B, then the conditional lower previsions {P1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , P m(XOm |XIm )}
avoid partial loss.
(2) If {P j(XO j |XI j )} j∈B avoid uniform sure loss for any B ∈ B, then the conditional lower previsions {P1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . ,
P m(XOm |XIm )} avoid uniform sure loss.
This theorem states that the properties of coherence graphs that we have investigated in the case of weak and strong
coherence hold similarly also in the case of the losses under consideration. The similarity goes even further, as discussed in
the next remark.
11 For instance, in [34, Section 3.8, Example 10] it is presented a case in which the mentioned inconsistencies lead traditional probabilistic logic to deduce
that a given event is certain a posteriori whereas the methods in WPV more correctly deduce that there is complete ignorance about it, i.e., that the
posterior probability for such an event lies in the interval [0,1].
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the conditional lower previsions avoid partial or uniform sure loss just from their separate coherence; to see that being
A1 is also necessary for this property, it suﬃces to notice that the counterexamples in the proof of Theorem 4 are linear
conditional previsions, for which weak coherence is equivalent to avoiding uniform sure loss and coherence is equivalent to
avoiding partial loss. Hence, the partition is minimal in the case of A1 coherence graphs.
For general (not necessarily A1) coherence graphs, the partition may not be minimal if we want to deduce the avoid-
ing partial loss condition: if we consider the previsions in Example 2, it is not diﬃcult to show that if P (X2|X1) and
P (X2, X3|X1) avoid partial loss, then they also avoid partial loss with P (X1). With respect to avoiding uniform sure loss,
using again that the previsions in the counterexamples in the proof of Theorem 4 are linear conditional previsions, it follows
that the partition is the minimal one from which we can deduce the avoiding uniform sure loss condition.
8.3.2. Bridging coherence graphs and probabilistic satisﬁability
We can ﬁnally exploit coherence graphs in WPV. We focus in particular on using WPV to the extent of checking whether
a collection {P1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , P m(XOm |XIm )} of separately coherent lower previsions avoids uniform loss. Recalling that we
are considering ﬁnite spaces of possibilities, this can be re-phrased as using WPV to check whether a collection of closed
and convex, conditional and unconditional, sets of mass functions, avoids uniform loss.
This task can be particularly onerous for WPV. Let us recall that WPV checks that the assessments avoid uniform loss
by running a linear program (or more than one). But probabilistic satisﬁability is an NP-hard problem. This means that
in practice the size of the linear program, corresponding to [34, Eq. (1)], grows exponentially large with the size of the
input. In the setup that we consider, this is a consequence of the number of linear constraints in the program which grows
according to the size of the joint possibility space X n , i.e., as an exponential function of n.
Consider for example the collection of lower previsions that gives rise to the graph in Fig. 1. Say that each of the sixteen
variables under consideration takes values from a set with three elements. Then the number of constraints in the program
is about 43 millions, quite a prohibitive one.
But we know that we can apply Theorem 9 at this point. Theorem 9 allows us to decompose the above linear problem
into two much smaller ones, according to the superblocks in Fig. 5: one superblock of six variables and another of ﬁve.
That is, in two linear problems with about 700 and 240 constraints, respectively. In this example, coherence graphs make it
possible to solve eﬃciently something that would be intractable otherwise.
This is not an isolated case: every time a coherence graph allows some proper superblocks to be isolated, the size of the
largest linear program decreases according to an exponential function of the number of variables contained in the largest
superblock: then, similarly to what happens also in the case of Bayesian nets, the computation is no longer exponential
in a global feature of the model, such as the number of variables, but in a local one, which has the potential to lead
to eﬃcient solutions in a number of real-world problems. There is also another advantage: using smaller linear programs
reduces the risks originated by numerical instabilities: both those involved in using collections that are more general than
A1, as mentioned at the end of Section 8.1.2, and those more strictly related to the kinds of linear problems needed to check
avoiding uniform loss, as reported in [34].
9. Some possible extensions of our results
This work is focused on the problem of the coherence of a collection of closed and convex sets of distributions. The
formalism that we have introduced is consequently based on some constant related features. One is that we work with
variables. Another one is that the joint space of possibilities X n for these variables is the product of the spaces of the
individual variables. A ﬁnal one is that every lower prevision that we consider is deﬁned on the set of all the gambles
relative to the involved variables. Although this setup is the more general one for our aims, it is not the more general that
one could consider.
In this section, we brieﬂy investigate to what extent our results could be extended to more general setups. This could
be useful in particular for problems of probabilistic satisﬁability/logic. In fact, in such a ﬁeld it is not uncommon to focus
on problems where the lower previsions are not deﬁned on all gambles; and also on problems where the joint space
of possibilities X n is not a product space because there are so-called logical constraints between the possible values of
the variables under consideration that make some of the joint values impossible. This holds for WPV but also for more
traditional approaches in artiﬁcial intelligence, e.g., [19,31], as well as other approaches based on coherent probabilities [7].
Actually, the problems of probabilistic satisﬁability are usually not even expressed in the language of previsions condi-
tional on variables that we have considered in this paper, and are rather deﬁned using events. Nevertheless, it is not diﬃcult
to consider variables that take values in the conditioning events in order to express everything in our language. Let us give
an example of this:
Example 3. Let us consider three events A, B and C, and assume that we are given the probabilities P (A|B), P (C |A ∩
B), P (B|C). Deﬁne the variables X1, X2, X3, where X1 takes values in {B, Bc}, X2 takes values in {A ∩ B, Ac ∩ B, A ∩
Bc, Ac ∩ Bc} and X3 takes values in {C,Cc}. In the language of this paper, the above assessments could be expressed as
P (X2|X1), P (X3|X2) and P (X1|X3), where these previsions are deﬁned, respectively, on IA , IC and IB . In this case, the
associated coherence graph is as in Fig. 10. Since we have a cycle in the coherence graph, we can only know that these
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assessments are not always coherent. Note however that if we were given the probabilities P (A|B), P (C |A ∩ B) and P (B),
they would be expressed in terms of the above variables as P (X2|X1), P (X3|X2) and P (X1). Their associated coherence
graph is A1 and as a consequence they are always coherent.
The following sections detail our investigation on the remaining problems. Section 9.1 deals with the case when the lower
previsions P j(XO j |XI j ), j = 1, . . . ,m are deﬁned on domains H j that are subsets of the sets K j of XO j∪I j -measurable gam-
bles. Section 9.2 discusses the problem of logical dependence. We also report on a further possible extension in Section 9.3
that is concerned with the case when we know the coherence of some subsets of the collection of lower previsions, and
these subsets do not make up a partition as we have always assumed so far. Finally, we give some concluding remarks in
Section 9.4.
9.1. Considering smaller domains
One of the assumptions we have made in this paper is that the domain of the conditional lower prevision P i(XOi |XIi )
is the whole set Ki of XO i∪Ii -measurable gambles, i.e., the set of gambles which depend on the value that the variables
XOi , XIi take. Although when the domain of P i(XOi |XIi ) is a subset K′ i of Ki we can always extend it to Ki using the
procedure of natural extension, we think it is also of interest to discuss in some detail this case.
To simplify our reasoning, we are going to assume that K′ i is a linear subset of Ki . It is not diﬃcult to extend our
reasoning to the case where K′ i is a non-linear set (for instance a ﬁnite set), using the work in [22].
The ﬁrst important thing to remark here is that the suﬃcient conditions we give in this paper for coherence, weak
coherence and avoiding partial and uniform sure loss in Theorems 2, 3 and 9 also hold if the domains are smaller. For this,
it suﬃces to consider that the only assumptions in the domains we make in their proofs are that for any f ∈ K′ i and any
subset A of XIi , the gamble f IA is also in K′ i; but this can be assumed without loss of generality as a consequence of
separate coherence [33, Lemma 6.2.4].
With respect to the necessary condition we establish in Theorem 4 for deducing weak coherence, it does not generalise to
conditional lower previsions with arbitrary linear domains: if we think for instance of conditional lower previsions deﬁned
on constant gambles only, they are coherent as soon as they are separately coherent (i.e., as soon as they satisfy P i(μ|XIi ) =
μ for any constant μ ∈ R). This holds irrespective of their coherence graph, so this does not need to be A1.
If we want Theorem 4 to hold in this more general situation, we need to impose some additional constraints on K′ i . It
can be checked that all the results hold if for all i = 1, . . . ,n, P i(XOi |XIi ) satisﬁes the following two conditions:
(SD1) For any subset A of XO i∪Ii , its indicator function IA belongs to K′ i .
(SD2) For all gambles f ∈ K′ i and all subsets A of XO i∪Ii , the gamble f IA belongs to K′ i .
Note that if P i(XOi |XIi ) is separately coherent, we can assume without loss of generality that its domain K′ i includes
all constant gambles. In that case, condition (SD1) is a consequence of (SD2). Note moreover that (SD2) cannot be seen
as a consequence of separate coherence, because IA may not only depend on the conditioning variables, but also on the
conditional ones. The proof of Theorem 4 implies also that when conditions (SD1) and (SD2) hold, the partition we deﬁne
is the minimal one which allows to deduce the property of avoiding uniform sure loss.
9.2. Adding logical dependence considerations
Another important issue for the applicability of our results is that of logical independence. In this paper, we have as-
sumed that the variables X1, . . . , Xn are logically independent, meaning that we consider any combination (x1, . . . , xn) in
X n as a possible value for the joint variable Xn . It is not uncommon, however, to consider variables that satisfy some kind
of logical dependence assumption, which in the end will imply that some elements in X n are ‘structurally’ impossible values
for the joint variable (X1, . . . , Xn) and therefore they should be removed from the joint possibility space.
With respect to this, the ﬁrst observation we have to make is that the partition of the conditional lower previsions
associated to the superblocks is not enough to deduce weak or strong coherence (or avoiding partial or uniform sure loss)
when we have in addition some logical dependence considerations; and this can happen even with ﬁnite spaces and precise
conditional previsions, as we show in the following example:
Example 4. Consider two binary variables X1, X2, and take the previsions P (X2), P (X1) determined by P (X2 = 1) = 1 =
P (X1 = 0). These previsions are coherent because their associated coherence graph is A1; however, they are incompatible
with the logical dependence assumption X1 = X2, because any compatible model P will satisfy P (X1 = 0, X2 = 1) = 1.
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by giving upper probability zero to the impossible combinations. If we know for instance that the variables X1, X2 can only
assume together values in the subset A of X{1,2} , we can make the assessment P (A) = 1. This can be expressed by the
unconditional lower prevision P (X1, X2) on K{1,2} given by P ( f ) = infω∈A f (ω). We discuss the use of this method together
with coherence graphs below. There is a cautionary note, however: strictly speaking, the fact that some joint values are
given zero upper probability is in general only one implication of logical dependence, in the sense that the converse is not
necessarily true: an event with upper probability zero need not be regarded as ‘structurally’ impossible. In the following
we shall refer to the case where some joint values are given upper probability zero as practical impossibility to distinguish
it from logical dependence. The following discussion leads then to suﬃcient conditions to check coherence (or loss) notions
under practical impossibility. When the focus in on logical dependence instead, and the difference between this and practical
impossibility is enforced in applications, our results below should be regarded as necessary conditions. Whether these are
also suﬃcient conditions in general for logical dependence is an open problem that should be considered in future work.
As we said, we can model the practical impossibility of some combinations of values as additional unconditional
lower previsions P ′1, . . . , P ′k . Then we should like to verify the coherence or weak coherence of the assessments
P1, . . . , P n, P
′
1, . . . , P
′
k . For this, we can apply the reasoning in this paper and build the associated coherence graph. Its
superblocks will produce a partition of the set of previsions with the property that it suﬃces to verify coherence (resp.,
weak coherence, avoiding partial loss, avoiding uniform sure loss) within each of the elements of the partition to immedi-
ately deduce coherence (resp., weak coherence, avoiding partial loss, avoiding uniform sure loss) of all the assessments.
Note that in order to do this the ﬁrst thing we must verify is that we are still working with a collection of previsions.
If a practical impossibility assumption is expressed in terms of an unconditional P ′(X1, X2) and we already have another
assessment P (X1, X2), then we should check whether also P (X1, X2) satisﬁes such an assumption; if it does not, then our
assessments are not coherent. If it does, then we do not need to include P ′(X1, X2) in our set of assessments.
Since we are working with more assessments now, the superblocks we have in the coherence graph will be bigger in
general, and therefore the associated partition will be coarser. In the worst of cases, if we have a practical impossibility
assumption that involves all the variables, it will be expressed as an unconditional P ′(X1, . . . , Xn), and all the previsions
will belong to the same superblock. In that case the coherence graphs will not help to simplify the veriﬁcation of coherence.
The other extreme case will be that when the practical impossibility assumptions involve only the variables which are
already in the same superblock, as in the following example:
Example 5. Assume that we have variables X1, . . . , X5, and that we make the assessments P1(X1|X2), P2(X2|X1), P3(X5|X3)
and P4(X5|X4). Their associated coherence graph is given in Fig. 11. If we make now the assumptions X1 = X2 and X3 = X4,
they would be included in the graph by means of the unconditional previsions P5(X1, X2), P6(X3, X4). The new coherence
graph would be as in Fig. 12. We see that P1(X1|X2), P2(X2|X1), P3(X5|X3) and P4(X5|X4) are coherent and compatible
with the practical impossibility assumptions if P1(X1|X2), P2(X2|X1) are coherent and compatible with X1 = X2 on the one
hand and P3(X5|X3) and P4(X5|X4) are coherent and compatible with X3 = X4 on the other.
Hence, in some cases we only need to verify the practical impossibility assumptions within each of the superblocks, and
we should be able to deduce coherence. We could expect that in a number of cases there will be a situation intermediate
between the two extreme ones just presented: the superblocks will grow by adding practical impossibility considerations
and the biggest one will not coincide with the entire graph. In these cases, coherence graphs will be useful as they will still
permit to decompose the original problem in smaller ones to some degree.
The situation is a bit simpler if we focus on weak coherence instead of coherence. Assume that we have a num-
ber of weakly coherent conditional lower previsions, and that the practical impossibility considerations imply that only
the values in A ⊆ X n are acceptable for the joint variable (X1, . . . , Xn). It can be checked that the unconditional lower
prevision E deﬁned in the proof of Theorem 1 is the smallest coherent lower prevision which is weakly coherent with
P1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , P m(XOm |XIm ) [21]. If it also satisﬁes E(A) = 1, then we deduce that the assessments are also compatible
Fig. 11. Coherence graph of the collection {P1(X1|X2), P2(X2|X1), P3(X5|X3), P4(X5|X4)}.
Fig. 12. The coherence graph in Fig. 11 modiﬁed so as to add considerations of practical impossibility.
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sition 5, it should be possible to simplify also the study of the compatibility of the avoiding uniform sure loss condition
with practical impossibility considerations.
9.3. Making non-disjoint assumptions of coherence
In this paper, we have focused on the problem of deducing the coherence of a number of conditional lower previsions
from the coherence of the previsions that belong to some sets. In our formulation, we have always assumed that we are
given a partition of the set of conditional lower previsions. We have proven that a tool for verifying coherence or weak
coherence can be to compare this partition to the minimal partition that we can derive using the superblocks of the
coherence graph.
It would be interesting, however, to consider also the case where the information we are given is not made in terms
of a partition, but that we are said that some sets of conditional lower previsions are coherent, and these sets are not
disjoint. For instance, we may consider the assessments P (X1, X2), P (X2|X1), P (X1|X2), and we may be told that any two
of these assessments are coherent. That is, we know that P (X1, X2), P (X2|X1) are coherent, that P (X1, X2), P (X1|X2) are
also coherent (which implies then that the three assessments are weakly coherent) and also that P (X2|X1), P (X1|X2) are
coherent, and we would like to know if we can deduce from this the (joint) coherence of P (X1, X2), P (X2|X1), P (X1|X2).
Such a situation is considered for instance in [33, Section 7.9.1].
One way of using our results would be to consider partitions which are ﬁner than the information we are given, and
to compare these with the minimal partition. This would provide us with a suﬃcient condition for deducing coherence.
Nevertheless, this approach is not always fruitful: in the above example, we should not be able to derive coherence, even
though it has been established in [33, Section 7.9.1]. A thorough study of this matter would be one of the main open
problems to consider in the future.
9.4. Concluding remarks
We summarise here the three main outcomes of the previous sections.
The ﬁrst is a positive answer for the extension to problems based on smaller domains: coherence graphs can be used as
before to decompose also those problems. What we lose in general here is the optimality of the decomposition in the case
of weak coherence, but this does not seem to be critical especially if we regard coherence (resp. avoiding partial loss) as
the consistency notion on which to focus rather than weak coherence (resp. avoiding uniform sure loss).
The second outcome concerns what we have called statements of practical impossibility, which is a concept related to
logical dependence. In this case we can well include this kind of statements in a coherence graph, but we do not know
in general how much this will affect the topology of the graph, and hence the minimal partition. It is possible that the
partition stays the same (and even that the resulting graph is A1), that it grows, and in the worst case that it coincides
with the entire graph. Therefore in some cases coherence graphs will still prove to be useful also under considerations of
practical impossibility; but the prospect to fully exploit them together with such considerations is an open problem at this
time.
It is also an open problem to extend our results to the case when we know that some subsets of the assessments are
coherent and they do not form a partition.
10. Discussion
Coherence can be regarded as the very essence of a theory of personal probability. But working directly with coherence
can be particularly onerous. The present paper is an attempt to deal with this diﬃculty in the case of Walley’s important
notion of (strong) coherence, and to deliver tools that make easier to check it. We have been inspired in this by the lesson
of graphical models, and have indeed deﬁned a new graphical model called a coherence graph.
Coherence graphs are means to render explicit the structure behind the notion of coherence. We have shown that such a
structure induces a minimal partition of the available collection of lower previsions, with the characteristic that the coher-
ence within each set of the partition implies the coherence of the overall collection. This result is very general: it holds for
lower previsions and for any cardinality of the possibility spaces involved. In particular, since it holds for lower previsions,
it is also applicable to determine the coherence of a collection of conditional linear previsions, and therefore is also useful
in the precise context. The generality of the results is also what has enabled us to apply them to problems as diverse as
proving the coherence of Bayesian and credal networks, and decomposing problems of compatibility or probabilistic satis-
ﬁability into smaller ones. On the other hand, such a generality has needed proofs that are somewhat long and technically
involved. This is also due to the fact that graphs are naturally models of distributed computation and this clashes with the
global nature of coherence. This nevertheless, the presented results are easy to exploit in practise, as we have provided a
polynomial-time algorithm that computes the minimal partition of a coherence graph very eﬃciently.
On a more theoretical level, our results appear to shed light on speciﬁc aspects of coherence, thanks especially to co-
herence graphs of type A1. These graphs correspond to collections of separately coherent lower previsions that are coherent
irrespective of the numerical values that make them up. They are related to the generalisation of the marginal extension
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conditional lower previsions in our collection template, and such an order is just what allows us to use the generalised
marginal extension theorem. In this way, we have also given an easy graphical characterisation of the extent to which the
theorem can be applied: to A1-representable collection templates. Moreover, when the associated coherence graph is A1,
the conditional lower previsions in the template are lower envelopes of coherent linear previsions. This does not hold for
all collections of coherent conditional lower previsions, as is shown in [33, Section 6.6]. So it is remarkable that our results
lead naturally to a Bayesian sensitivity analysis interpretation of the collection of conditional lower previsions.
Remember that we have shown that there are important conceptual differences between the notions of weak and strong
coherence proposed by Walley. Weak coherence is equivalent to the existence of a joint lower prevision that is coherent
with each of the assessments. In the particular case of conditional linear previsions and ﬁnite spaces, this is equivalent
to the existence of a joint mass function inducing each of the conditionals by means of Bayes’ rule. The introduction of
the notion of strong coherence is needed because some conditional lower previsions can have a common joint and still be
clearly incoherent with one another. Remarkably, this happens even in the linear and ﬁnite case mentioned above.
Taking this into account, we ﬁnd it noteworthy that, for the problem tackled here, weak and strong coherence exhibit
a similar behaviour: if we have a number of assessments and all we know about them is that each of them is separately
coherent, we can guarantee that they are weakly coherent exactly under the same conditions for which we can deduce their
joint coherence: we just need the graph representing the collection template to be A1. More generally, we have established
a partition of the graph for which weak coherence inside implies weak coherence of them all, and we have proven that
strong coherence inside this partition also implies the strong coherence of all the assessments. It may be also useful to
recall that completely analogous considerations hold when we consider loss notions, such as avoiding partial, or uniform
sure, loss. We should also recall that there are differences: for example, we have shown that the minimal partition obtained
using a coherence graph is indeed minimal in the case of weak coherence and not necessarily so for strong coherence.
There are some important open problems related to this paper. One would be the possibility to fully exploit coherence
graphs under considerations of logical dependence, as we have proposed a partial solution to this problem. It seems to us
that to extend our proposal it will be necessary on the one hand to investigate its theoretical properties, and on the other
hand to specialise the models used in this paper. This could be done, for example, by strengthening the notion of collection
template so as to insert some knowledge about the numbers that make up the lower previsions in the collection; or it could
be done by focusing on coherence graphs with special topologies or dealing with variables taking values from ﬁnite sets
(or even binary variables). These considerations could also simplify problems in probabilistic logic, different from those we
have considered in this paper. As another topic for future research in this respect, we suggest the study of the optimisation
compatibility problem [15,34], where one looks for the smallest joint which is compatible with a number of assessments. We
think that the functional E deﬁned in the proof of Theorem 1 should play an important role here.
One possible extension we have not discussed yet would be to consider an inﬁnite set of variables in our assessments;
if we still have a ﬁnite number of conditional lower previsions, we think it should be possible to use coherence graphs
to determine their coherence and their weak coherence, by making compact representations of the variables. The prob-
lem is more complicated if we consider an inﬁnite number of variables and assessments; in that case, we should ﬁrst of
all generalise the coherence notions in [33] to an inﬁnite number of assessments, and such a generalisation may not be
immediate.
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Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1. (⇒) This part of the proof is very similar to the one that Walley gives in [33, Theorem 8.1.8] for
coherence. For this reason, we only give a brief sketch of this part.
Assume that P1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , P m(XOm |XIm ) are weakly coherent. Let us deﬁne the lower prevision E on L(X n) by
E( f ) := sup
{










To see that E is well-deﬁned, it suﬃces to note that sup f  E( f ) inf f for any gamble f : given α > sup f , there are no
gambles f1, . . . , fm satisfying the above equation or we contradict the weak coherence of P1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , P m(XOm |XIm );
and for any α < inf f we can take f1 = · · · = fm = 0. It is also easy to see that E satisﬁes conditions (C1)–(C3), and as a
consequence it is a coherent lower prevision. Let us show next that E, P1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , P m(XOm |XIm ) are weakly coherent,
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 > 0. Then the deﬁnition of












where G( f ) = f − E( f ) (just consider α = E( f ) − 
2 in the deﬁnition of E). Hence, G( f ) >
∑m
j=1 G j(g j |XI j ) − 
2 .
There are two possible cases in Eq. (3): that j0 ∈ {1, . . . ,m} (case (a) below) or that it does not (case (b)).
(a) Consider f0 ∈ K j0 , z0 ∈ XI j0 for some j0 in {1, . . . ,m}. Then, using Eq. (A.1), the super-additivity of P j(XO j |XI j ) for
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Since this holds for any 
 > 0, we deduce that supx∈X n [
∑m
j=1 G j( f j |XI j ) + G( f ) − G j0 ( f0|z0)](x) 0.
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where the second inequality follows from Eq. (A.1), and the third from the super-additivity of the conditional lower
previsions P j(XO j |XI j ) for j = 1, . . . ,m. But this means that we can raise the value E( f0) by 
2 , which contradicts the
deﬁnition of E . Since this holds for any 
 > 0, we deduce that supx∈X n [
∑m
j=1 G j( f j |XI j ) + G( f ) − G( f0)](x) 0.
Hence, E, P1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , P m(XOm |XIm ) are weakly coherent, and as a consequence, for any j = 1, . . . ,m, E and
P j(XO j |XI j ) are weakly coherent. From [33, Section 6.5], we deduce that for any j = 1, . . . ,m, f ∈ K j , and any x ∈ XI j ,
E(G j( f |XI j )) 0 and E(G j( f |x)) = 0.
(⇐) Take f j ∈ K j, j = 1, . . . ,m, f0 ∈ K j0 , z0 ∈ XI j0 for some j0 ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Take g j := G j( f j |XI j ), j = 1, . . . ,m, g0 :=
G j0 ( f0|z0). Then we deduce from the assumption that P (g j) 0 for j = 1, . . . ,m, and P (g0) = 0, whence g j = G j( f j |XI j )













G(g j) − G(g0)
]
(x) 0,
where the second inequality follows from the coherence of P . We deduce that P1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , P m(XOm |XIm ) are weakly
coherent.
For the second statement, let P1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , Pm(XOm |XIm ) be weakly coherent conditional linear previsions. Use
[33, Section 6.5.5] to deduce that any linear prevision P that dominates the coherent lower prevision P , that exists
because of the ﬁrst part of the theorem, will satisfy P (G j( f |XI j )) = 0 for any j = 1, . . . ,m and any f ∈ K j , whence
P ( f ) = P (P j( f |XI j )). The converse implication follows trivially from the ﬁrst part of the theorem. 
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always include in this family an unconditional lower prevision P deﬁned in the constant gambles. The converse implication
is trivial. 
Proof of Corollary 1. The direct implication has been established in the proof of Theorem 1. The converse implication is
trivial. 
Before we prove Proposition 3, we are going to give three lemmas that show how we can constrain the probability of
any actual node in a block. The ﬁrst two lemmas will be applied to blocks associated to a node with more than one parent,
while Lemma 4 will be employed when dealing with blocks associated to a cycle. Lemma 2 will also be employed when we
show how the notion of weak coherence can be veriﬁed through smaller parts in Theorem 4.
Lemma 2. Let us consider xi1, x
i
2 ∈ Xi for i = 1, . . . ,n. Deﬁne the previsions P1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , Pm(XOm |XIm ) with respective domains
K1, . . . ,Km by12 P j( f ) := f ((xi1)i∈O j ) if I j = ∅, and
P j( f |y) :=
{
f ((xi1)i∈O j , y) if y = (xi1)i∈I j
f ((xi2)i∈O j , y) otherwise,
if I j = ∅, for any j = 1, . . . ,m, y ∈ XI j and f ∈ K j . Then the previsions P1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , Pm(XOm |XIm ) are coherent.
Proof. First of all, it follows immediately that these previsions satisfy conditions (SC1)–(SC3) in Section 2, and are therefore
separately coherent. Moreover, since they are all linear, coherence is equivalent to avoiding partial loss (Eq. (2)). Hence, we






G j( f j |XI j )(x) 0, (A.2)
where, in order to simplify the notation, in the case where I j = ∅ we also use G j( f j |XI j ) to denote G j( f j).





G j( f j |XI j )(x) 0,
and this condition holds trivially by considering x := (xi1)i=1,...,n , for which all the terms in the sum are equal to 0.
Let us assume next that I j = ∅ for j = 1, . . . ,m, i.e., that we are dealing with conditional linear previsions only. Note
that we can assume without loss of generality that f j  0 for all j = 1, . . . ,m: otherwise, it suﬃces to consider for each j
the gamble f ′j = f j − inf f j  0, which satisﬁes G j( f ′j |XI j ) = G j( f j |XI j ).




}∪ {(xi2)i∈O j × (XI j \ {(xi1)i∈I j})}
and the gambles g j := f jIA j , where IA j is the indicator function of A j . Since both f j and IA j are XO j∪I j -measurable, we
deduce that g j belongs to K j . Moreover, given y ∈ XI j ,
P j(g j |y) =
{
g j((xi1)i∈O j , y) if y = (xi1)i∈I j
g j((xi2)i∈O j , y) otherwise,
whence P j(g j|XI j ) = P j( f j |XI j ). Since g j  f j for any j = 1, . . . ,m because f j  0, this implies that G j(g j|XI j ) G j( f j |XI j )
for all j. Moreover, given y ∈ A j , we have that G j(g j |XI j )(y) = 0, and if y /∈ A j , G j(g j|XI j )(y) = −P j(g j|πI j (y)) =−P j( f j |πI j (y)) 0, taking into account that the gamble f j is non-negative by assumption.
Now, if g j = 0 for all j = 1, . . . ,m, then G j(g j|XI j )(x) = 0. Since G j( f j |XI j ) G j(g j |XI j ), we deduce that G j( f j |XI j )(x)
0 for any x ∈ X n and for all j = 1, . . . ,m, and considering any element in the union of the supports we see
that Eq. (A.2) holds. Assume now that g j = 0 for some j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Since (xi1)1in ∈ A j for all j = 1, . . . ,m,∑m
j=1 G j(g j |XI j )(xi1)1in = 0. Hence, if there is some B ∈
⋃m
j=1 S j(g j) such that (xi1)1in ∈ B , then Eq. (A.2) holds.
If (xi1)1in /∈ B for any B ∈
⋃m
j=1 S j(g j), let j1 be the smallest integer such that g j1 = 0. Consider B1 ∈ S j1 (g j1 ). Then
there is some y1 ∈ XI j1 such that B1 = {y1} × XIcj1 .
12 We use here the one-to-one correspondence between gambles on XO j∪I j and gambles in K j .
132 E. Miranda, M. Zaffalon / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 173 (2009) 104–144Let z1 := {y1} × (xi2)i∈Icj1 ∈ B1. That is, the i-th component of z1 is the i-th component of y1 if i ∈ I j1 , and is equal to
xi2 otherwise. Note that y1 = (xi1)i∈I j1 , or we should have that (xi1)1in ∈ B1, a contradiction. As a consequence, z1 ∈ A j1 ,
and therefore G j1 (g j1 |XI j1 )(z1) = 0. If
∑m
j=1 G j(g j |XI j )(z1) 0, we deduce that Eq. (A.2) holds. If
∑m
j=1 G j(g j |XI j )(z1) < 0,
then there is some j2 ∈ {1, . . . ,m} such that G j2 (g j2 |XI j2 )(z1) < 0. Since G j2 (g j2 |XI j2 )(z) = 0 for any z outside S j2 (g j2 ),
we deduce the existence of some B2 ∈ S j2 (g j2 ) such that z1 ∈ B2. For this B2, there is some y2 ∈ XI j2 such that B2 =
{y2}×XIcj2 . Note that y2 = (x
i
1)i∈I j2 , using the same reasoning as before. Let z2 := {y2}× (xi2)i∈Icj2 denote the element of X
n
whose ith component is the ith component of z1 if i ∈ I j2 , and is xi2 otherwise. Then z2 ∈ A j2 , whence G j2 (g j2 |XI j2 )(z2) = 0.
Moreover, for any i = 1, . . . ,n, if the ith component of z1 is xi2, then so is the ith component of z2 by deﬁnition; hence, if
we deﬁne the mapping h : X n → {0, . . . ,n} such that h(z) is the number of i such that πi(z) is equal to xi2, we have that
h(z2) h(z1). If we had h(z2) = h(z1), then it would be z2 = z1, whence z1 ∈ A j2 and G j2 (g j2 |XI j2 )(z1) = 0, a contradiction.
Hence, it is h(z2) > h(z1).
Again, if
∑m
j=1 G j(g j |XI j )(z2)  0, we deduce that Eq. (A.2) holds. If this sum is negative, then there is some j3 such
that G j3 (g j3 |XI j3 )(z2) < 0. We deﬁne then z3 as the element of X n whose ith component is the ith component of z2 if
i ∈ I j3 , and is xi2 otherwise. Then it belongs to the same element of S j3 (g j3 ) than z2, and moreover h(z3) > h(z2).
If we follow this procedure, we obtain a sequence of elements (zn) in the union of the supports of g j such that h(zn) >
h(zn−1) for all n. But since 0 h(z) n for all z ∈ X n , this process must be ﬁnite. If we stop with some z for which h(z) < n,
this means that there is some z in
⋃m
j=1 S j(g j) such that
∑m
j=1 G j(g j |XI j )(z)  0. On the other hand, if we stop with z
such that h(z) = n, that is, with z = (xi2)1in , this means that (xi2)1in belongs to
⋃m
j=1 S j(g j) and, since it belongs to
A j for all j, we have
∑m
j=1 G j(g j |XI j )(z) = 0. As a consequence,
∑m
j=1 G j( f j |XI j )(z)
∑m
j=1 G j(g j |XI j )(z) = 0. This shows
that P1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , Pm(XOm |XIm ) are coherent. 
Lemma 3. Take xi1 = xi2 ∈ Xi for i = 1, . . . ,n. Let us deﬁne the previsions P1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , Pm−1(XOm−1 |XIm−1) with respective
domains K1, . . . ,Km−1 by P j( f ) := f ((xi1)i∈O j ) if I j = ∅, and
P j( f |y) :=
{
f ((xi1)i∈O j , y) if y = (xi1)i∈I j
f ((xi2)i∈O j , y) otherwise,
if I j = ∅ for any y ∈ XI j , f ∈ K j . Let Pm(XOm |XIm ) be given by Pm( f ) := f ((xi1)i∈Om ) for any f ∈ Km if Im = ∅, and Pm( f |y) :=
f ((xi1)i∈Om , y) for any y ∈ XIm and f ∈ Km if Im = ∅. Then P1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , Pm(XOm |XIm ) are weakly coherent.
Proof. It is easy to see that these previsions satisfy conditions (SC1)–(SC3) in Section 2, and are therefore separately coher-





G j( f j |XI j )(x) 0. (A.3)
Now, since G j( f j |XI j )(y) = 0 for y = (xi1)i=1,...,n , and for all j = 1, . . . ,m, we deduce that Eq. (A.3) holds and therefore
P1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , Pm(XOm |XIm ) are weakly coherent. 
Next, we show that the value of a parent of a dummy node in a cycle which is not in the cycle itself can also be
determined by the previsions in the cycle:
Lemma 4. Consider indices j1, . . . , jp satisfying Eq. (5), i.e., determining a cycle, and let k ∈ I j1 \ O jp . Then for any x ∈ Xk there are
weakly coherent previsions P1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , Pm(XOm |XIm ) such that any joint prevision P which is coherent with P ji (XO ji |XI ji )
for i = 1, . . . , p satisﬁes P (x) = 1.
Proof. Take i ∈ I ji ∩ O ji−1 for i = 1, . . . , p, where for simplicity of notation we make j0 := jp . For each i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, let us
consider xi1 = xi2 in Xi , and such that xk1 := x. Let us deﬁne P1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , Pm(XOm |XIm ) with domains K1, . . . ,Km by
P j1 ( f |y) :=
{
f ((xi2)i∈O j1 , y) if π1 (y) = x
1
1 , y = (xi1)i∈I j1
f ((xi1)i∈O j1 , y) otherwise
for any y ∈ XI j1 , f ∈ K j1 ,
P js ( f |y) :=
{
f ((xi1)i∈O js , y) if πs (y) = xs1
f ((xi ) , y) otherwise2 i∈O js
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and
P j( f |y) :=
{
f ((xi1)i∈O j , y) if y = (xi1)i∈I j
f ((xi2)i∈O j , y) otherwise,
if I j = ∅ for any y ∈ XI j and any f ∈ K j .
These previsions satisfy conditions (SC1)–(SC3) in Section 2, and are therefore separately coherent. Moreover, they are
also weakly coherent. For this, we have to show that for any f j ∈ K j , j = 1, . . . ,m, Eq. (A.3) holds. But it is easy to see that
G j( f j |XI j )(y) = 0 for y = (xi1)i=1,...,n , and this for all j = 1, . . . ,m.
Next, we show that any joint P which is coherent with each of the conditional previsions P j1 (XO j1 |XI j1 ), . . . ,




)+ P(xi2 )= P(P ji−1(xi1 |XI ji−1 ))+ P(P ji−1(xi2 |XI ji−1 ))= 1,
because P ji−1 (x
i
1 |XI ji−1 ) + P ji−1 (x
i
2 |XI ji−1 ) = 1 for any i = 1, . . . , p. In particular,
1 = P(x11 )+ P(x12 )= P({z: π1 (z) = x11 ,πi(z) ∈ {xi1, xi2} ∀i ∈ I j1})+ P(x12 ),
where the second equality holds because P ({xi1, xi2}) = 1 for all i ∈ I j1 . We are going to show that the ﬁrst of these terms is
equal to P ((xi1)i∈I j1 ) and that the second is equal to 0. In order to prove this, we are going to use that for i = 2, . . . , p,
P
({
z ∈ X n: πi+1 (z) = πi (z)
})= P({z: πi (z) ∈ {xi1 , xi2 },πi+1 (z) = πi (z)})
= P(P ji ({z: πi (z) ∈ {xi1 , xi2 },πi+1 (z) = πi (z)}|XI ji ))= P (0) = 0,






)= P(xi2 , xi+11 )= 0, i = 2, . . . , p. (A.4)
The equality P ({xi1 , xi2 }) = 1, valid for i = 1, . . . , p, implies that P (x21 ) = P ({z: π2 (z) = x21 ,πi (z) ∈ {xi1 , xi2 }, i =
3, . . . , p}). Take z such that π2 (z) = x21 , πi (z) ∈ {xi1 , xi2 }, i = 3, . . . , p and such that z = (xi1 )i=2,...,p . Then there is
some i in {2, . . . , p − 1} such that πi (z) = xi1 ,πi+1 (z) = xi+12 , and Eq. (A.4) implies that P (z) = 0. We deduce that
P (x21 ) = P ((xi1 )i=2,...,p). A completely similar argument shows that P (x22 ) = P ((xi2 )i=2,...,p).
Now, P (x12 , x
2
2 ) = P (P j1 (x12 , x22 |XI j1 )) = 0, whence P (x
1




)= P(x12 , x21 )= P(x12 , (xi1 )i=2,...,p) P(x12 , xp1 )= 0,
using Eq. (A.4), and therefore P (x12 ) = 0. Consider on the other hand z ∈ XI j1\{1} different from (xi1)i∈I j1\{1} . Then




)= P(x11 , z, x22 )= P(x11 , z, (xi2 )i=2,...,p) P(x11 , xp2 )= 0,
again using Eq. (A.4). Hence, P ({z : π1 (z) = x11 ,πi(z) ∈ {xi1, xi2} ∀i ∈ I j1 }) = P ((xi1)i∈I j1 ) and therefore 1 = P (x
1
1 ) + P (x12 ) =
P ((xi1)i∈I j1 ). In particular, P (x
k
1) = 1. 
Proof of Proposition 3. Let X be a source of contradiction. Then, because any source of contradiction has parents in the
coherence graph, there exists some i1 ∈ {1, . . . ,m} such that  ∈ O i1 . Apply Lemma 2 with x1 := x2 := x. Then we obtain
a set of coherent conditional linear previsions, and any joint P which is coherent with Pi1 (XOi1 |XIi1 ) satisﬁes P (x) =
P (Pi1(x|XIi1 )) = P (1) = 1.
Consider next a node X which is a predecessor of a source of contradiction, and x ∈ X . We have the following possi-
bilities:
(1) Assume ﬁrst of all that there is a successor Xs of the node X which has more than one parent. Let us consider a
constraining sub-block for X in this block, i.e., different i1, . . . , ip in {1, . . . ,m} such that s ∈ O i1 ∩ O i2 , Ii2 ∩ O i3 =
∅, . . . , Iip−1 ∩ O ip = ∅, and  ∈ Iip . Apply Lemma 3 with m := i1 and x1 := x; then any joint P which is coherent with
Pi1 (XOi1 |XIi1 ) will satisfy P (xs1) = P (Pi1(xs1|XIi1 )) = 1. As a consequence, we have that 1 = P (xs1) = P (Pi2(xs1|XIi2 )) =
P (xs1, (x
i
1)i∈Ii2 ), whence P ((x
i
1)i∈Ii2 ) = 1, and in particular P (xt1) = 1 for any t ∈ Ii2 ∩ O i3 . A similar reasoning allows
us to show that P ((xi1)i∈Ii3 ) = 1, and by following this procedure we also deduce that P (x1) = 1. Hence, in this case
we can deﬁne weakly coherent conditional previsions P1, . . . , Pm such that any prevision P which is coherent with
Pi1 (XOi |XIi ), . . . , Pip (XOi |XIi ) satisﬁes P (x) = 1.1 1 p p 1
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originated by a cycle. In particular, X is the predecessor of some node in an elementary cycle in the block. If X is a
parent of a dummy node in the cycle but is not in the cycle itself, the result follows from Lemma 4.
If neither of the previous possibilities holds, then there must be a path in the graph connecting X with a dummy node
in the elementary cycle. We consider then a constraining sub-block for X in the block associated to this cycle. Take
then j1, . . . , jp in {1, . . . ,m} such that O j1 ∩ I j2 = ∅, O j2 ∩ I j3 = ∅, . . . , O jp ∩ I j1 = ∅, and k1, . . . ,kr in {1, . . . ,n} such
that {k1, . . . ,kr−1} ⊆ {1, . . . ,n} \ { j1, . . . , jp},  ∈ Ok1 ∩ Ik2 , Ok2 ∩ Ik3 = ∅, . . . , Okr−1 ∩ Ikr = ∅, and kr = j1. Let us consider
ti ∈ Oki ∩ Iki+1 for i = 2, . . . , r − 1.
Take xi1 = xi2 ∈ Xi for i = 1, . . . ,n, and let us consider the previsions P1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , Pm(XOm |XIm ) deﬁned in
the proof of Lemma 4. Then these previsions are weakly coherent, and any prevision P which is coherent with
P j1 (XO j1 |XI j1 ), . . . , P jp (XO jp |XI jp ) satisﬁes P ((xi1)i∈I j1 ) = 1. As a consequence, we have that P (x
tr−1
1 ) = 1, because




1)i∈Ikr−1 ), whence P ((x
i
1)i∈Ikr−1 ) = 1, and in
particular P (xt1) = 1 for any t ∈ Ikr−1 ∩ Okr−2 . A similar reasoning allows us to show that P ((xi1)i∈Ikr−2 ) = 1, and by
following this procedure we also deduce that P (x1) = 1 for any P coherent with
P j1 (XO j1 |XI j1 ), . . . , P jp (XO jp |XI jp ), Pk1 (XOk1 |XIk1 ), . . . , Pkr−1 (XOkr−1 |XIkr−1 ).
This completes the proof. 
In order to simplify the proofs of Theorems 2 and 3, we are going to establish a couple of results (Lemmas 5 and 6)
that will be common to these proofs.
Lemma 5. Let us consider a non-empty subset J of {1, . . . ,m}. Let B1 be a partition of J , and deﬁne, for each C ∈ B1 , the set BC :=
{⋃ j∈C (I j ∪ O j)}. Then, if the sets {BC : C ∈ B1} are pairwise disjoint,13 the following statements hold:
(1) If {P j(XO j |XI j )} j∈C are coherent for all C ∈ B1 , then the lower previsions {P j(XO j |XI j )} j∈ J are coherent.
(2) If {P j(XO j |XI j )} j∈C are weakly coherent for all C ∈ B1 , then the lower previsions {P j(XO j |XI j )} j∈ J are weakly coherent.
Proof.
(1) Consider f j ∈ K j for j ∈ J , f0 ∈ K j0 , z0 ∈ XI j0 for some j0 ∈ J . Assume that I j = ∅ for any j such that f j = 0; otherwise,
the result follows from the second statement and the reduction theorem [33, Theorem 7.1.5]. Let C0 be the element of






G j( f j |XI j ) − G j0 ( f0|z0)
]
(x) 0;
hence, for any 
 > 0 there is some xC0 ∈ DC0 such that[∑
j∈C0









G j( f j |XI j )(x) 0;
hence, given 
 > 0 there is some xC ∈ DC such that∑
j∈C
G j( f j |XI j )(xC )−
. (A.6)
Let us consider now an element z ∈ X n satisfying πBC (z) = πBC (xC ) for any C ∈ B1; such an element exists because the
sets {BC : C ∈ B1} are pairwise disjoint. Then we deduce from Eqs. (A.5) and (A.6) that[∑
j∈ J




13 This assumption means that given C1 = C2 ∈ B1, the subgraphs associated to BC1 and BC2 are not connected.
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 > 0, we deduce
that the conditional lower previsions {P j(XO j |XI j )} j∈ J are coherent.
(2) Using a similar reasoning and the notations from the previous point, we deduce that for any 
 > 0 there is some xC0
such that[∑
j∈C0




On the other hand, for any C = C0 in B1, there is some xC such that∑
j∈C
G j( f j |XI j )(xC )−
.
Now, since the sets {BC : C ∈ B1} are pairwise disjoint, we deduce from these two equations that for any element z of
X n such that πBC (z) = πBC (xC ) for all C ∈ B1,[∑
j∈ J




Again, since we can do this for any 
 > 0, we deduce that the conditional lower previsions {P j(XO j |XI j )} j∈ J are weakly
coherent. 
Lemma 6. Let {P1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , P m(XOm |XIm )} be a separately coherent collection template whose graph is A1. Let I be a non-
empty subset of {1, . . . ,n} which is disjoint with⋃mj=1 O j , and let x ∈ XI . Then for any f j ∈ K j, j = 1, . . . ,m, j0 ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, f0 ∈






G j( f j |XOi ) − G j0 ( f0|z0)
]
(y) 0. (A.7)
Proof. We are going to assume that the gamble G j0 ( f0|z0) is not identically equal to zero; the result when G j0 ( f0|z0) = 0
follows as a corollary. From Lemma 1, we can assume that Ok ∩ (⋃k−1j=1 I j) = ∅ for any k = 1, . . . ,m. For any such k, let us




( f |x) := P k
(
f (x, ·)|πIk (x)
)
.
Note that this is well-deﬁned because (I ∪ Ak−1) ∩ Ok = ∅.
For any k = 1, . . . ,m, Q
k
(XOk |XI∪Ik∪Ak−1 ) satisﬁes conditions (SC1)–(SC3) and is, therefore, separately coherent. This
follows from the separate coherence of P1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , P m(XOm |XIm ). On the other hand, they are conditional on an in-
creasing sequence of variables. Applying the marginal extension theorem for variables in [23], we conclude that Q 1, . . . , Q m
are coherent.14
Consider f j ∈ K j, j = 1, . . . ,m, j0 ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, f0 ∈ K j0 , z0 ∈ XI j0 . Let us deﬁne the gambles h1 :=
∑ j0−1
j=1 G j( f j |XI j ) and
h2 :=∑mj= j0 G j( f j |XI j ) − G j0 ( f0|z0). Let us also deﬁne g j := f jIπ−1I (x) for j = 1, . . . , j0 − 1. Then, since both f j and Iπ−1I (x)
belong to H j , it follows that g j ∈ H j for j = 1, . . . , j0 −1. Moreover, any set E in the XI∪I j∪A j−1 -support of g j is included in
π−1I (x). Besides, for any y ∈ π−1I (x), g j(y) − Q j(g j|XI∪I j∪A j−1 )(y) = f j(y) − P j( f j |XI j )(y). We deduce from the coherence
of Q 1, . . . , Q j0−1 that there is some E ∈
⋃ j0−1

























 > 0, and let y1 ∈ E satisfy h1(y1)−
 . Let E1 := π−1I∪A j0−1 (y1). Note that if j0 = 1 then we simply have h1 = 0
(it vanishes from the following equations) and E1 := π−1I (x). There are two possibilities:
14 For this, note that the domain Hk of Q
k
(XOk |XI∪Ik∪Ak−1 ), which is the set of XI∪Ak -measurable gambles, is included in the set of XI∪Ik+1∪Ak -
measurable gambles, and that the partitions on the conditioning side are increasingly ﬁner.
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j for all j = j0, . . . ,m, and any
element in the support of g j is included in E1. We deduce from the coherence of Q j0 , . . . , Q m that there is some




























taking into account Eq. (A.8), that the gamble h1 is identically equal to h1(y1) on E1 and that supy∈E1 h2(y) 
supy∈E2 h2(y) 0. As a consequence,
sup
y∈π−1I (x)




and since we can do this for any 
 > 0, we deduce that Eq. (A.7) holds.
• If E1∩π−1I j0 (z0) = ∅, we consider z1 in this intersection, and let y2 := πI∪I j0∪A j0−1 (z1). Note that E2 := π
−1
I∪I j0∪A j0−1 (y2) ⊆
E1 ∩ π−1I j0 (z0). Let us consider the gambles g j := f jIE2 for j = j0, . . . ,m. It follows from the coherence of Q j0 , . . . , Q m






g j − Q (g j|XI∪I j∪A j−1 ) − G j0 (g0|y1)
]
(y) 0; (A.9)
note that it follows from the deﬁnition of the gambles g j, j = j0, . . . ,m and of y1 that E3 ⊆ E2, and as a consequence





























taking into account that the gamble h1 is identically equal to h1(y1) on E1, which is a superset of E3, and Eq. (A.9).
Since we can do this for any 
 > 0, we deduce that Eq. (A.7) holds.
This completes the proof. 
Corollary 3. Let {P1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , P m(XOm |XIm )} be a separately coherent collection template whose graph is A1. Then, for any






G j( f j |XO j ) − G j0 ( f0|z0)
]
(y) 0
for some B ∈⋃mj=1 S j( f j) ∪ π−1I j0 (z0).
Proof. The result follows by using the same reasoning as in the previous proof, now with I = ∅. The main difference is that






G j( f j |XO j ) − G j0 ( f0|z0)
]
(y) 0
for some E2 included in some B ∈⋃mj=1 S j( f j) ∪ π−1I (z0). j0







G j( f j |XO j ) − G j0 ( f0|z0)
]
(x) 0 (A.10)
for some E ∈⋃mj=1 S j( f j) ∪ π−1I j0 (z0).
Let B1 be the subset of B given by the sets C with |C | > 1, i.e., those associated to superblocks. Assume that B1 = ∅; if
B1 = ∅, then the result follows from Corollary 3. For any C ∈ B1 let us consider the set BC :=⋃ j∈C (I j ∪ O j). Then it follows
from the deﬁnition of the superblocks that the sets {BC : C ∈ B1} are pairwise disjoint subsets of {1, . . . ,n}. Let us deﬁne
J :=⋃C∈B1 C . Deﬁne the gambles h1 :=∑ j∈ J G j( f j |XI j )− I J ( j0)G j0 ( f0|z0) and h2 :=∑ j∈ J c G j( f j |XI j )− I J c ( j0)G j0 ( f0|z0).
From Lemma 5, the previsions {P j(XO j |XI j )} j∈ J are coherent. As a consequence, there is some E ∈
⋃
j∈ J S j( f j) ∪








 > 0, and let x1 ∈ E satisfy h1(x1)  −
 . Let us consider I :=⋃C∈B1 BC and y1 := πI (x1). Note that the gamble
h1 is XI -measurable, and that π−1I (y1) is included in E because I j ⊆ I for any j ∈ J .
The coherence graph of the previsions {P j(XO j |XI j )} j∈ J c is A1 because they do not belong to any superblock. Moreover,







G j( f j |XI j ) − I J c ( j0)G j0 ( f0|z0)(x) 0.
Since h1 is identically equal to h1(x1)−
 on π−1I (y1), supx∈π−1I (y1) h1(x) + h2(x)−
 + supx∈π−1I (y1) h2(x)−
 , and
because π−1I (y1) is included in E we deduce that supx∈E h1(x)+h2(x)−
 . Since we can make a similar reasoning for any

 > 0, we deduce that Eq. (A.10) holds. 
Proof of Theorem 3. We proceed in the same way as in the proof of Theorem 2. The main difference is that, instead of






G j( f j |XI j ) − G j0 ( f0|z0)
]
(x) 0 (A.11)
for any f j ∈ K j, j = 1, . . . ,m, j0 ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, f0 ∈ K j0 and z0 ∈ XI j0 .
Using the notations from the previous proof, if B1 = ∅, then the result follows from Corollary 3. Assume then that
B1 = ∅. We deduce from Lemma 5 that the previsions {P j(XO j |XI j )} j∈ J are weakly coherent. As a consequence, for any

 > 0 there exists some x1 in X n such that h1(x1)  −
 . Let y1 := πI (x1) ∈ XI . Now, since the coherence graph of the







G j( f j |XI j ) − I J c ( j0)G j0 ( f0|z0)(x) 0.
h1 is identically equal to h1(x1)−
 on π−1I (y1), whence supx∈π−1I (y1) h1(x) + h2(x)−
 + supx∈π−1I (y1) h2(x)−
 . Since
we can make a similar reasoning for any 
 > 0, we deduce that Eq. (A.11) holds. 
Proof of Theorem 4. The suﬃciency part is a consequence of Theorem 3. Let us show the necessity part.
Assume ex absurdo that B is not ﬁner than B′ . Then there exists some B ∈ B with non-empty intersection with more
than one B ′ ∈ B′ . It follows that B must be the set of indices of the lower previsions in a superblock of the coherence graph:
otherwise, the cardinality of B would be 1. We shall identify the subset B of {1, . . . ,m} with the corresponding superblock
in the coherence graph. Then B is the union of a ﬁnite number of different blocks, B Z1 , . . . , B Zk , which are originated by
different sources of contradiction. We shall denote by J i the set of indexes of the lower previsions represented in the block
B Zi , for i = 1, . . . ,k.
One of the following possibilities must hold:
(a) There exists some i ∈ {1, . . . ,k} such that J i has non-empty intersections with different B ′1, B ′2 in B′ .
(b) Condition (a) does not hold and there are i1 = i2 in {1, . . . ,k} such that J i1 ⊆ B ′1, J i2 ⊆ B ′2 for different B ′1, B ′2 in B′ .
In case (a), we have two possibilities: that the block associated to J i is related to a node with more than one parent
(points (a1) and (a2) below), or that it corresponds to a cycle (points (a3) and (a4) below).
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{P1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , P m(XOm |XIm )} that are not weakly coherent and such that for any B ′ in B′ , {P j(XO j |XI j )} j∈B ′ are weakly
coherent.
(a) Assume that J i has non-empty intersections with different B ′1, B ′2 in B′ . Then one of the following possibilities must
hold:
(a1) There exists an actual node Xs in B Zi with two or more parents, corresponding to lower previsions in different
elements of B′ (see Fig. 13). Formally, this holds if and only if there are i1 = i2 ∈ J i such that s ∈ O i1 ∩ O i2 , and
i1 ∈ B ′1, i2 ∈ B ′2 for B ′1 = B ′2. Consider ys1 = ys2 in Xs .
Deﬁne coherent (and in particular weakly coherent) conditional previsions P1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , Pm(XOm |XIm ) by
means of Lemma 2 such that Pi1 (y
s
1|XIi1 ) is identically equal to 1, whence any joint P that is weakly co-
herent with Pi1 (XOi1 |XIi1 ) satisﬁes P (ys1) = 1 (use xs1 := xs2 := ys1). Apply Lemma 2 again with xs1 := xs2 := ys2
to deﬁne coherent P ′1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , P ′m(XOm |XIm ) such that P ′i2 (ys2|XIi2 ) is the constant gamble on 1, whence
any joint P weakly coherent with P ′i2 (XOi2 |XIi2 ) satisﬁes P (ys2) = 1. Deﬁne now the conditional previsions
Q 1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , Qm(XOm |XIm ) by
Q j(XO j |XI j ) :=
{
P j(XO j |XI j ) if j ∈ B ′1
P ′j(XO j |XI j ) otherwise.
These previsions are separately coherent and moreover for any B ′ ∈ B′ the previsions {Q j(XO j |XI j )} j∈B ′ are
weakly coherent. Given any coherent prevision P on L(X n) such that P ( f ) = P (Q j( f |XI j )) for any f ∈ K j
and for any j = 1, . . . ,m, we should have P (ys1) = P (Q i1 (ys1|XIi1 )) = 1 on the one hand, and P (ys2) =
P (Q i2 (y
s
2|XIi2 )) = 1 on the other; hence, P (ys1) = P (ys2) = 1, a contradiction. Using Theorem 1, we deduce that
Q 1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , Qm(XOm |XIm ) are not weakly coherent.
(a2) Assume that for any node Xs in the block B Zi with more than one parent all the previsions corresponding to
its parents belong to the same element of B′ . Then there must be an actual node X in the graph which is a
predecessor of a node Xs with more than one parent and such that the previsions in a constraining sub-block for
X in the block associated to Xs belong to the same element B ′1 of B′ , and there is another arc pointing at X
whose associated prevision belongs to some B ′2 = B ′1 in B′ . See Fig. 14 for an example.
Formally, this holds if and only if there are i1, . . . , ip, ip+1 in J i such that s ∈ O i1 ∩ O i2 , Ii2 ∩ O i3 = ∅, . . . , Iip−1 ∩
O ip = ∅, Iip ∩ O ip+1 = ∅,  ∈ Iip ∩ O ip+1 , and {i1, . . . , ip} ∈ B ′1, ip+1 ∈ B ′2.
Consider x1 = x2 in X . Use Proposition 3 to deﬁne weakly coherent P1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , Pm(XOm |XIm ) such that any
joint P weakly coherent with {Pi j (XOi j |XIi j )} j=1,...,p satisﬁes P (x1) = 1. Apply now Lemma 2 to deﬁne coherent
P ′1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , P ′m(XOm |XIm ) such that any joint P coherent with P ′ip+1(XOip+1 |XIip+1 ) satisﬁes P (x2) = 1.
Deﬁne Q 1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , Qm(XOm |XIm ) by
Q j(XO j |XI j ) :=
{
P j(XO j |XI j ) if j ∈ B ′1
P ′j(XO j |XI j ) otherwise.
Then these previsions are separately coherent and moreover for any B ′ ∈ B′ we have that {Q j(XO j |XI j )} j∈B ′ are
weakly coherent. Now, given any coherent prevision P on L(X n) s.t. P ( f ) = P (Q j( f |XI j )) for any f ∈ K j and
Fig. 13. An example of the graphical situation considered in point (a1). In this case X7 has two parents in different sets of B′ , and we can create a
contradiction on it by inducing two different marginals through the two different parent previsions. We use the dashed line to denote that one of the
parent previsions is in an element of B′ and the other is in another element.
Fig. 14. An example of the graphical situation considered in point (a2). In this case we can create a contradiction on X1, (i.e., X) by inducing two different
marginals, one from its parent and the other one from X3 through the constraining sub-block connecting X1 and X3 via X8 (i.e., Xs). We use the dashed
line to denote that the prevision having X1 in the conditional side does not belong to the constraining sub-block.
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element of B′ compared to the previous dummy node in the elementary cycle, as denoted by the dashed lines.
for any j = 1, . . . ,m, we should have P (x1) = 1 = P (x2), a contradiction. Using Theorem 1, we deduce that the
conditional previsions Q 1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , Qm(XOm |XIm ) are not weakly coherent.
(a3) Both (a1) and (a2) do not hold. This means that the block B Zi , whose set of indices J i has non-empty intersections
with different B ′1 and B ′2, is not generated by an actual node with more than one parent, but by a cycle. Take any
elementary cycle in such a cycle.
Assume ﬁrst that not all the dummy nodes in the elementary cycle belong to the same element of B′ . This implies
that there are two adjacent dummy nodes in the elementary cycle that belong to different elements of B′ (see
Fig. 15 for an example).
That is, assume the existence of different j1, . . . , jp in J i such that O j1 ∩ I j2 = ∅, O j2 ∩ I j3 = ∅, . . . , O jp ∩ I j1 = ∅
and such that j1 ∈ B ′1, j2 ∈ B ′2. Take i ∈ I ji ∩ O ji−1 for i = 1, . . . , p, where for simplicity of notation we make
j0 := jp .
Consider xi1 = xi2 ∈ Xi for i = 1, . . . ,n, and apply Lemma 2 to deﬁne coherent P1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , Pm(XOm |XIm ).
Deﬁne then yi1, y
i
2 in Xi for i = 1, . . . ,n by
yi1 :=
{




xi1 if i = 1
xi2 otherwise.
Apply again Lemma 2 with these values to deﬁne coherent conditional previsions P ′1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , P ′m(XOm |XIm ),
and deﬁne then the conditional previsions Q 1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , Qm(XOm |XIm ) by
Q j(XO j |XI j ) :=
{
P j(XO j |XI j ) if j ∈ B ′1
P ′j(XO j |XI j ) otherwise.
Let us show that Q j1 (XO j1 |XI j1 ), . . . , Q jp (XO jp |XI jp ) are not weakly coherent: assume ex-absurdo that they are.




)+ P(xi2 )= P(Q ji−1(xi1 |XI ji−1 ))+ P(Q ji−1(xi2 |XI ji−1 ))= 1,
because P ji−1 (x
i
1 |XI ji−1 ) + P ji−1 (x
i
2 |XI ji−1 ) = P ′ji−1 (x
i
1 |XI ji−1 ) + P ′ji−1 (x
i
2 |XI ji−1 ) = 1 for any i = 1, . . . , p, whence
Q ji−1 (x
i
1 |XI ji−1 ) + Q ji−1 (x
i
2 |XI ji−1 ) = 1 for any i = 1, . . . , p. Hence, for i = 2, . . . , p,
P
({
z ∈ X n: πi+1 (z) = πi (z)
})= P({z: πi (z) ∈ {xi1 , xi2 },πi+1 (z) = πi (z)})
= P(Q ji ({z: πi (z) ∈ {xi1 , xi2 },πi+1 (z) = πi (z)}|XI ji ))= P (0) = 0,






)= P(xi2 , xi+11 )= 0 (A.12)
for i = 2, . . . , p.
The equality P (xi1 ) + P (xi2 ) = 1, valid for i = 1, . . . , p, implies that P (x21 ) = P ({z: π2 (z) = x21 ,πi (z) ∈
{xi1 , xi2 }, i = 1, . . . , p}). Take z such that π2 (z) = x21 , πi (z) ∈ {xi1 , xi2 }, i = 1, . . . , p}, and such that z = (xi1 )i=1,...,p .
Then there is some i in {2, . . . , p} such that πi (z) = xi1 ,πi+1 (z) = xi+12 , and Eq. (A.12) implies that P (z) = 0. We
deduce that P (x21 ) = P ((xi1 )i=1,...,p). A completely similar argument shows that P (x22 ) = P ((xi2 )i=1,...,p).
Now, P (x11 , x
2
1 ) = P (Q j1 (x11 , x21 |XI j1 )) = 0, and as a consequence P (x
2
1 ) = P ((xi1 )i=1,...,p) = 0. A completely
similar argument shows that P (x12 , x
2
2 ) = 0, whence P (x22 ) = P ((xi2 )i=2,...,p) = 0. But this implies that 1 =
P (x21 ) + P (x22 ) = 0, a contradiction. Hence, Q j1 (XO j1 |XI j1 ), . . . , Q jp (XO jp |XI jp ) are not weakly coherent.
(a4) Assume next that all the dummy nodes in the elementary cycle chosen in the previous point belong to the same
B ′1, but that there is a predecessor X of one of these dummy nodes which belongs to another B ′2 (see Fig. 16 for
an example).
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of B′ , but a dummy predecessor of the elementary cycle belongs to a different element, as denoted by the dashed line. We create then a contradiction on
Xl = X6 by inducing a marginal from its parent that is different from the marginal induced through the elementary cycle.
Fig. 17. An example of the graphical situation considered in point (b). In this case we create a contradiction on Xl = X3, which is a node shared by two
adjacent blocks, as denoted by the dashed lines. The contradiction is obtained by inducing a marginal from one block and a different marginal from the
other block.
Consider then different j1, . . . , jp in {1, . . . ,m} such that O j1 ∩ I j2 = ∅, O j2 ∩ I j3 = ∅, . . . , O jp ∩ I j1 = ∅, and
assume that X is a predecessor of the dummy node j1. Then there are k1, . . . ,kr in {1, . . . ,m} such that
{k1, . . . ,kr−1} ⊆ {1, . . . ,m} \ { j1, . . . , jp},  ∈ Ok1 ∩ Ik2 , Ok2 ∩ Ik3 = ∅, . . . , Okr−1 ∩ Ikr = ∅, and kr = j1. That is, the in-
dices {k2, . . . ,kr−1, j1, . . . , jp} determine a constraining sub-block for X in the block associated to the elementary
cycle.
Assume that j1, . . . , jp,k2, . . . ,kr−1 ∈ B ′1 and k1 ∈ B ′2 for B ′2 = B ′1. Take x1 = x2 in X . Then we can use Proposi-
tion 3 to deﬁne weakly coherent conditional previsions P1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , Pm(XOm |XIm ) such that any P coherent
with P j(XO j |XI j ) for j ∈ { j1, . . . , jp,k2, . . . ,kr−1} satisﬁes P (x1) = 1. Similarly, we can use Lemma 2 to deﬁne co-
herent conditional lower previsions P ′1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , P ′m(XOm |XIm ) such that any joint P which is coherent with
P ′k1 (XOk1 |XIk1 ) satisﬁes P (x2) = 1. Let us consider then Q 1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , Qm(XOm |XIm ) deﬁned by
Q j(XO j |XI j ) :=
{
P j(XO j |XI j ) if j ∈ B ′1
P ′j(XO j |XI j ) otherwise;
then it follows that for any B ∈ B′ the previsions {Q j(XO j |XI j )} j∈B ′ are weakly coherent. However, any coherent
prevision P which is coherent with each of them should satisfy P (x1) = 1 on the one hand, and P (x2) on the
other. Hence, Q 1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , Qm(XOm |XIm ) are not weakly coherent.
(b) If (a) does not hold, then for any i = 1, . . . ,k, the set of indices associated to the block B Zi is included in some B ′ ∈ B′ .
Since B has non-empty intersection with different elements of B′ , and the deﬁnition of B implies that any block B Z1
in B has another block B Z2 in B such that B Z1 and B Z2 share an actual node, we deduce that there are 1 i1 = i2  k
such that J i1 ⊆ B ′1, J i2 ⊆ B ′2 and the blocks B Zi1 , B Zi2 share some actual node X: we can start with a block of B and
move to the adjacent blocks until we arrive to one which is not included in the same element of B′ . The result then
follows from the fact that two adjacent blocks share at least one actual node. See Fig. 17 for an example.
Consider two different values x1 = x2 in X . Then applying Proposition 3, there are conditional previsions P1(XO 1 |XI1),
. . . , Pm(XOm |XIm ) that are weakly coherent and such that any joint that is weakly coherent with {P j(XO j |XI j )} j∈ J i1
satisﬁes P (x1) = 1.
The same proposition guarantees the existence of weakly coherent conditional previsions P ′1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , P ′m(XOm |XIm )
such that any joint P that is weakly coherent with {P ′j(XO j |XI j )} j∈ J i2 satisﬁes P (x2) = 1.
Deﬁne now conditional previsions Q 1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , Qm(XOm |XIm ) by
Q j(XO j |XI j ) :=
{
P j(XO j |XI j ) if j ∈ B ′1
P ′j(XO j |XI j ) otherwise.
Then these previsions are separately coherent and moreover for any B ′ ∈ B′ we have that {Q j(XO j |XI j )} j∈B ′ are weakly
coherent. Now, given any coherent prevision P on L(X n) which is coherent with all these conditional previsions, we
should have P (x1) = 1 = P (x2), a contradiction. Using Theorem 1, we deduce that Q 1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , Qm(XOm |XIm ) are
not weakly coherent. 
Proof of Proposition 4. It is trivial that the ﬁrst statement implies the second. That the second statement implies the third
follows from Theorem 4, once we remark that the coherence graph is of type A1 if and only if the minimal partition is
B = {1, . . . ,m}. Finally, Corollary 3 guarantees that the third statement implies the ﬁrst. 
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implies that it is the lower envelope of a family of separately coherent conditional previsions Mi := {Pi(XOi |XIi )}.
Now, if we select a conditional prevision in Mi for each i = 1, . . . ,m, they belong to the same collection tem-
plate as {P1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , P m(XOm |XIm )}. Proposition 4 implies then that they are jointly coherent, and therefore{P1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , P m(XOm |XIm )} is the lower envelope of a family of coherent conditional previsions. 
Proof of Theorem 6. We start by deﬁning a bound on the number of arcs in a coherence graph. Remember that a coherence
graph can be regarded as the union of its D-structures. Since a D-structure can be made of n arcs at most, we deduce that
the number of arcs in a coherence graph is bounded by m · n.
It is also useful to consider the number of different blocks in a coherence graph: since a block can be identiﬁed with
one the sources of contradiction that originates it, and because a source of contradiction is an actual node, the number of
different blocks is bounded by the number of actual nodes, namely n.
Now, consider that one effect of the interplay between findMinPartition and findBlock is a visit of the entire
graph. This means that all its arcs are traversed once and hence the visit has worst-case complexity O (m · n), given the
previous bound on the number of arcs. This complexity takes into account the fact that findBlock stops its visit at a
certain node if this is tagged already, thus preventing an arc from being visited more than once.
To ﬁnd out the overall complexity of the procedures, now we have to consider that the second effect jointly produced by
findMinPartition and findBlock, through mergeBlocks, is to ﬁll the array minPartition. This array is scanned
every time a new, different block is found. Since the size of the array is m and the number of different blocks is bounded
by n, as said above, ﬁlling the array minPartition has worst-case complexity O (m · n).
Overall, we deduce that findMinPartition, findBlock, and mergeBlocks, have a joint worst-case complexity
given by O (m · n) (also considering that the remaining calculations done by them have a complexity dominated by such an
expression).
Finally, in order to deﬁne the complexity to ﬁnd the minimal partition, we must consider that the three procedures above
are based on the global data structures described at the beginning of Section 7. Therefore, we have to calculate also the
complexity to create such structures. In this case the computation that dominates the others, with respect to computational
complexity, is the identiﬁcation of the sources of contradiction. Identifying the actual nodes with more than a parent is
easy, and takes O (n). Finding out all the nodes that belong at least to a cycle in the graph is more complicated. Yet, as
stated at the end of Section 7, this is an immediate byproduct of the identiﬁcation of the strong components of the graph;
and the latter is a task that Tarjan’s algorithm in [29] solves in time O (m + n +m · n).
This complexity dominates the one arising from findMinPartition, findBlock, and mergeBlocks, whence we
obtain that the complexity to ﬁnd the minimal partition is just O (m + n +m · n). 
Proof of Theorem 8. We ﬁrst consider how to convert the graph of a credal net into the related coherence graph: it is
suﬃcient, for each node X j of the credal net, to insert a dummy node D j between X j and its parents XI j , so as to make D j
parent of X j and child of XI j , and to remove the arcs from XI j to X j . It is immediate from this conversion procedure to see
that the coherence graph resulting from that of a credal net is A1+: the coherence graph is acyclic because so is the graph
of a credal net; moreover, each actual node X j has exactly one parent. Another immediate consequence of the procedure is
that permuting the indexes of the conditional lower previsions in the coherence graph as in Lemma 1 can be done simply
by making them consistent with the partial order entailed by the graph of the credal net. Therefore, we can assume without
loss of generality that the set A j deﬁned in Section 8.1.1 after Lemma 1 indexes exactly the non-descendant non-parents of
X j , for all j = 1, . . . ,n.
Now we are ready to show that the strong extension of a credal network and the strong product of the related coherence
graph coincide.
Consider a prevision P dominating the strong extension obtained as in the deﬁnition of the strong product by applying
Eq. (8) to a collection {P1(XO 1 |XA1∪I1 ), . . . , Pn(XOn |XAn∪In )}. Here the generic element P j(XO j |XA j∪I j ) is a synthetic ex-
pression for a set of separately coherent conditional previsions {P j(XO j |z) ∈ ext(M(P ′j(XO j |z))): z ∈ XA j∪I j , P j(XO j |z′) =











π j(x)|πI j (x)
)
, (A.13)
where the ﬁrst passage is just Eq. (8) and the second depends on two considerations. The ﬁrst is that O j indexes the
variable X j alone when we deal with the coherence graph obtained from a Bayesian net. The second is more important:
X j does not depend stochastically on its non-descendant non-parents (XA j ) given its parents (XI j ). This follows because we
know that the chosen element of M(P ′j(XO j |z)) must be the same over all the values that XA j can take, by deﬁnition of
P j(XO j |XA j∪I j ); and because, by deﬁnition of P ′j(XO j |XA j∪I j ), an extreme point of M(P ′j(XO j |z)) is an extreme point of
M(P j(XO j |πI j (z))), and this only depends on XI j .
It follows that Eqs. (9) and (A.13) coincide, and hence that the selected element P dominating the strong product corre-
sponds to the joint mass function of a Bayesian net obtained choosing the assessments P j(X j |XI j ) P j(X j|XI j ) j = 1, . . . ,n,
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all the previsions P in the deﬁnition of the strong product, then the strong product dominates the strong extension.
Now consider an extreme point of the strong extension, i.e., equivalently, a joint linear prevision P . It is well known
(see [1, Proposition 1] for a proof) that P is obtained by applying Eq. (9) to mass functions corresponding to ex-
treme points of the local conditional credal sets, i.e., equivalently, to a collection {P1(X1|XI1), . . . , Pn(Xn|XIn )}, with
P j(X j|z) ∈ ext(M(P j(X j |z))) for all z ∈ XI j , j = 1, . . . ,n. From this, deﬁning the new collection of conditional previsions{P1(XO 1 |XA1∪I1 ), . . . , Pn(XOn |XAn∪In )} as in the deﬁnition of the strong product, and applying Eq. (A.13), we see that there
is an element of the strong product that coincides with P . Since this holds for all the extreme points of the strong extension,
then the strong extension dominates the strong product. 
Proof of Proposition 5. We start by proving the direct implication. Assume that {P1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , P m(XOm |XIm )} avoid
uniform sure loss. Given f j ∈ K j for j = 1, . . . ,m, this implies that supx∈X n
∑m
j=1 G j( f j |XI j )(x)  0. Let us deﬁne D :=
{G j( f j |XI j ) : f j ∈ K j for some j}. Applying [33, Lemma 3.3.2], we deduce the existence of a linear prevision P satisfying
P (G j( f j |XI j )) 0 for all f j ∈ K j, j = 1, . . . ,m, and in particular P (G j( f j |x)) 0 for all f j ∈ K j, x ∈ XI j , j = 1, . . . ,m.
Let us prove the existence, for every j = 1, . . . ,m and every x ∈ X j of a linear conditional prevision P j(XO j |x) dominating
P j(XO j |x) such that P (Ix( f − P j( f |x))) = 0 for all f ∈ K j ; from this, taking into account that the spaces are ﬁnite, we shall
deduce the existence of a conditional linear prevision P j(XO j |XI j ) that dominates P j(XO j |XI j ) and is coherent with P for
all j = 1, . . . ,m, and as a consequence of weakly coherent P1(XO 1 |XI1), . . . , Pm(XOm |XIm ) dominating our conditional lower
previsions.
Consider then j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and x ∈ XI j . There are two possibilities: if P (x) > 0, then the conditional linear previ-
sion P j(XO j |x) is uniquely determined by P using Bayes’ rule. To see that it dominates P j(XO j |x), assume ex-absurdo
the existence of some gamble f ∈ K j for which P j( f |x) > P j( f |x). Then it follows that 0  P (Ix( f − P j( f |x))) <
P (Ix( f − P j( f |x))) = 0, a contradiction. Finally, it P (x) = 0 we simply consider any linear conditional prevision P j(XO j |x)
that dominates P j(XO j |x) and it is automatically coherent with P .
The converse implication follows once we realise that (i) weakly coherent conditional previsions in particular avoid
uniform sure loss, and (ii) if some conditional lower previsions are dominated by others which avoid uniform sure loss,
then they also avoid uniform sure loss. 
The next lemma is needed in the proof of Theorem 9. It is the counterpart, for avoiding partial and uniform sure loss, of
Lemma 5.
Lemma 7. Let us consider a non-empty subset J of {1, . . . ,m}. Let B1 be a partition of J , and deﬁne, for each C ∈ B1 , the set BC :=
{⋃ j∈C (I j ∪ O j)}. Then, if the sets {BC : C ∈ B1} are pairwise disjoint, the following statements hold:
(1) If {P j(XO j |XI j )} j∈C avoid partial loss for all C ∈ B1 , then the lower previsions {P j(XO j |XI j )} j∈ J avoid partial loss.
(2) If {P j(XO j |XI j )} j∈C avoid uniform sure loss for all C ∈ B1 , then the lower previsions {P j(XO j |XI j )} j∈ J avoid uniform sure loss.
Proof.
(1) Consider f j ∈ K j for j ∈ J , f0 ∈ K j0 , z0 ∈ XI j0 for some j0 ∈ J . Assume that I j = ∅ for any j such that f j = 0; otherwise,
the result follows from the second statement, using also the reduction theorem [33, Theorem 7.1.5].





G j( f j |XI j )(x) 0;
hence, given 
 > 0 there is some xC ∈ DC such that∑
j∈C
G j( f j |XI j )(xC )−
. (A.14)
Let us consider now an element z ∈ X n satisfying πBC (z) = πBC (xC ) for any C ∈ B1; such an element exists because the
sets {BC : C ∈ B1} are pairwise disjoint. Then we deduce from Eq. (A.14) that[∑
j∈ J




and moreover z ∈ DC for all C ∈ B1 (and in particular for one of them). Since we can do this for any 
 > 0, we deduce
that the conditional lower previsions {P j(XO j |XI j )} j∈ J avoid partial loss.
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 > 0 and for any C in B1,
there is some xC such that∑
j∈C
G j( f j |XI j )(xC )−
.
Now, since the sets {BC : C ∈ B1} are pairwise disjoint, we deduce from this equation that for any element z of X n such
that πBC (z) = πBC (xC ) for all C ∈ B1,[∑
j∈ J




Again, since we can do this for any 
 > 0, we deduce that the conditional lower previsions {P j(XO j |XI j )} j∈ J avoid
uniform sure loss. 
Proof of Theorem9. We shall prove the result for avoiding partial loss; the proof for avoiding uniform sure loss is analogous.






G j( f j |XO j )
]
(x) 0 (A.15)
for some E ∈⋃mj=1 S j( f j).
Let B1 be the subset of B given by the sets C with |C | > 1, i.e., those associated to superblocks. Assume that B1 = ∅; if
B1 = ∅, then the result follows from Corollary 3. For any C ∈ B1 let us consider the set BC :=⋃ j∈C (I j ∪ O j). Then it follows
from the deﬁnition of the superblocks that the sets {BC : C ∈ B1} are pairwise disjoint subsets of {1, . . . ,n}. Let us deﬁne
J :=⋃C∈B1 C . Deﬁne the gambles h1 :=∑ j∈ J G j( f j |XI j ) and h2 :=∑ j∈ J c G j( f j |XI j ).
From Lemma 7, the previsions {P j(XO j |XI j )} j∈ J avoid partial loss. As a consequence, there exists some E ∈
⋃






 > 0, and let x1 ∈ E satisfy h1(x1)  −
 . Let us consider I :=⋃C∈B1 BC and y1 := πI (x1). Note that the gamble
h1 is XI -measurable, and that π−1I (y1) is included in E because I j ⊆ I for any j ∈ J .
The coherence graph of the previsions {P j(XO j |XI j )} j∈ J c is A1 because they do not belong to any superblock. Moreover,







G j( f j |XI j )(x) 0.
Since h1 is identically equal to h1(x1)−
 on π−1I (y1), supx∈π−1I (y1) h1(x) + h2(x)−
 + supx∈π−1I (y1) h2(x)−
 , and
because π−1I (y1) is included in E we deduce that supx∈E h1(x)+h2(x)−
 . Since we can make a similar reasoning for any

 > 0, we deduce that Eq. (A.15) holds. 
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